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ABSTRACT 
Virtually three-quarters of a century ago, the Supreme Court in West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette recognized that the First Amendment protects citizens from being forced to speak.  Often, new legal 
doctrines are announced cautiously and narrowly in anticipation of future judicial development.  Not so with 
Barnette.  The Court boldly proclaimed that the right to be free from state-compelled affirmation is so funda-
mental that it stands as the one “fixed star in our constitutional constellation” that cannot be moved.  State 
assertions of power that seek to coerce citizens to affirm government-approved ideas will inevitably fail, except 
when narrowly tailored to prevent “grave and immediate” danger.  The Justices further signified the force of this 
doctrine by applying it to a curricular exercise mandated by public school teachers—those state officials who 
regularly require young citizens to speak in our nation’s classrooms. 
While the Court has since confirmed the breadth of the compelled speech doctrine in multiple contexts outside of 
the classroom, its protections are now at risk of being eroded.  Over the past seventy-four years, the size and scope 
of the government’s role in education—particularly higher education—has increased dramatically.  The federal 
judiciary has largely accommodated this growth by granting public university officials more and more deference to 
their policies and curricular choices.  But recently, some courts have extended this deference to dilute Barnette’s 
scope and force in the public university classroom.  Indeed, two federal courts of appeals have held that curricular 
exercises that coerce college students to affirm official ideas will only face minimal judicial scrutiny when challenged 
in court.  Another court of appeals held that such compelled speech claims are waived entirely when students choose 
to enroll at a public university.  Not only are the circuits split, but neither of these conflicting positions properly 
respects the constitutional rights of students in the college classroom.  Under these approaches, a public university 
could use its curriculum to force its students to campaign for a political party, lobby for legislation, or even pledge 
allegiance to a particular ideological position.  This is not the legacy of Barnette. 
This Article maintains that Barnette and its progeny require more rigorous and nuanced scrutiny—not deferen-
tial review—of public university curricular requirements that compel student speech.  Only such an approach will 
permit teachers to teach while respecting the first liberties of college students in a manner consistent with compelled 
speech jurisprudence. 
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The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that 
robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth “out of a multitude of tongues, 
(rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.” 
—Keyishian v. Board of Regents1 
INTRODUCTION 
Two college students each face a constitutional conundrum.  Abigail is in 
her final semester at a state teacher’s college and is in danger of failing out of 
the program despite having a stellar GPA.  One of the college’s curricular 
mandates requires students in a capstone course to demonstrate a “respect 
for diversity and a commitment to social justice.”2  As part of this require-
ment, all students must sign the college’s Statement of Diversity and Social 
Justice.  Abigail refuses to sign the statement because she disagrees with some 
of its tenets.  Her professor will not pass her, and she will not be permitted to 
graduate if she will not sign the statement. 
Lauren is in the first year of her Master of Advocacy and Political Lead-
ership degree at a state university.  In a course on political advocacy, her 
professor is requiring all students to write a persuasive letter to the state leg-
islature supporting the passage of HB 1122.  This measure, if enacted, will 
permit students, faculty, and visitors to carry handguns into any public uni-
versity building in the state.  Lauren, an ardent supporter of gun control leg-
islation, refuses to write the letter on ideological grounds.  Her professor 
threatens to give her an “F” in the course if she fails to write the letter.3  
Abigail and Lauren both choose to file suit on the grounds that the curric-
ular requirements at their respective state institutions violate the First Amend-
ment by compelling them to voice an ideological message with which they 
disagree.  Currently, the outcome of their respective lawsuits is an open ques-
tion.  The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the measure of judicial 
 
 1 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). 
 2 Columbia University’s Teachers College imposed a similar requirement on its students.  See Colum-
bia University: Ideological Litmus Tests at Teachers College, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC., 
https://www.thefire.org/cases/columbia-university-ideological-litmus-tests-at-teachers-college 
(last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining Columbia University’s Teachers College’s mandate that “re-
quires students to demonstrate a ‘commitment to social justice’’’). 
 3 A student seeking a graduate degree in social work objected to a similar letter-writing assignment 
at Missouri State University.  See Elia Powers, Did Assignment Get Too Political?, INSIDE HIGHER ED 
(Nov. 1, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2006/11/01/complaint?width=775&-
height=500i&frame=true (discussing a student’s lawsuit against Missouri State University on the 
grounds that a class assignment restricted her free speech by requiring her to support legislation 
making gays and lesbians eligible to become foster parents). 
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scrutiny courts should apply to compelled curricular speech in the public uni-
versity context.4  Furthermore, the few circuit courts to have addressed the 
matter are split.  In the Eleventh Circuit, neither student would have a claim.5  
In the Sixth and Tenth Circuits, they would both have a claim, but the 
schools’ actions would be subject to minimal judicial scrutiny.6  No other fed-
eral court of appeals has directly tackled the matter, and the issue has received 
only marginal scholarly attention.  This silence in the law and scholarship is 
unsettling, to say the least, as higher education moves to an experiential learn-
ing model that greatly expands the college classroom.7  Students learning un-
der this modern model are often required to advocate for ideological view-
points in “real-life” opportunities both on and off campus—and in several 
high-profile cases, universities appear to have exploited teaching opportuni-
ties for political purposes.8  Thus, the question is ripe for review. 
 
 4 However, in Southworth, the Supreme Court addressed the compelled speech doctrine’s application 
to compelled extracurricular speech.  See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 
U.S. 217, 221 (2000) (holding that “[t]he First Amendment permits a public university to charge its 
students an activity fee used to fund a program to facilitate extracurricular student speech if the 
program is viewpoint neutral”). 
 5 See Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878–79 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining why plaintiff-
student could not prevail on her free speech claim against defendant-university). 
 6 See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734, 735 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding that plaintiff’s First Amendment 
claim deserves to go before a jury even though “it is the rare day when a student can exercise a First 
Amendment veto” over a university’s curriculum requirement); see also Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 
356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating that “[n]eutral rules of general applicability ordinarily 
do not raise free exercise concerns even if they incidentally burden a particular religious practice or 
belief,” and are subject to rational basis review). 
 7 See Peter Stokes, Job Skills Increasing Focus of Many Colleges, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 4, 2013), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/views/2013/10/04/job-skills-increasing-focus-many-colleges-
essay (“The pursuit of jobs or job readiness or real-world work experience seems to be the trend of 
trends . . . . This can be seen in the growing focus on experiential learning opportunities—whether 
it takes the form of internships and co-ops, or field research experiences, or participation in business 
incubators, or any number of other kinds of outside-the-classroom learning experiences.”). 
 8 See, e.g., Citrus College: Compulsory Anti-War Speech, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC., 
https://www.thefire.org/cases/citrus-college-compulsory-anti-war-speech (last visited July 16, 
2017) (“A Citrus College professor had compelled undergraduate students to write anti-war letters 
to President George W. Bush, penalizing the grades of  students who dissented or refused to send 
the letters.”); College Prof Makes Students Recite Anti-American ‘Pledge of Allegiance,’ FOX NEWS (Dec. 8, 
2014), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2014/12/08/college-prof-makes-students-recite-anti-ameri-
can-pledge-allegiance.html (criticizing a Metropolitan State University of Denver professor who 
required his students to recite an anti-American alternative to the Pledge of Allegiance); Kate Har-
diman, Professors Tell Students: Drop Class if You Dispute Man-Made Climate Change, THE COLLEGE FIX 
(Aug. 31, 2016),  http://www.thecollegefix.com/post/28825/ (recounting how “professors co-
teaching an online course called ‘Medical Humanities in the Digital Age’ at the University of Col-
orado–Colorado Springs recently told their students via email that man-made climate change is not 
open for debate, and those who think otherwise have no place in their course”); Greg Lukianoff, 
FAU College Student Who Didn’t Want to Stomp on ‘Jesus’ Runs Afoul of Speech Code, FORBES (Mar. 26, 
2013, 8:37 PM), http://onforb.es/14mSzGO  (discussing a Mormon student at Florida Atlantic 
University who was charged with violating the school’s harassment policy when he refused to stomp 
on a piece of paper with the word ‘Jesus’ on it as part of a class assignment); Missouri State University: 
Oct. 2017] THE ONE FIXED STAR IN HIGHER EDUCATION 89 
This Article argues that current judicial approaches err by treating all com-
pelled curricular speech claims the same and by subjecting them to a single 
standard that excessively defers to university educators.  A proper and com-
plete inquiry would be much more rigorous.  A court reviewing such a claim 
should apply strict scrutiny when the purpose or effect of an academic exercise 
compels a student to affirm a belief.  A court may, however, employ a more 
deferential standard toward university educators when they merely require stu-
dents to speak information that does not implicate other constitutional rights. 
Part I of this Article explores the development of the compelled speech 
doctrine generally and examines the few cases that attempt to apply this doc-
trine to compelled curricular speech in the public university classroom.  Part 
II proposes a rigorous multi-tiered framework courts should apply when re-
viewing such claims, and Part III explains the legal justification for each part 
of the proposed analysis.  Part IV addresses and rebuts the primary objec-
tions to this framework, and Part V applies the proposed framework to a 
variety of scenarios involving compelled speech at public universities. 
I.  THE COMPELLED CURRICULAR SPEECH PROBLEM 
A.  The Compelled Speech Doctrine 
The Supreme Court first formally recognized the compelled speech doc-
trine in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette9 by acknowledging that 
the First Amendment10 generally precludes the government from telling peo-
ple what they must say.  The Court has developed this doctrine in four distinct 
lines of cases in which the government has forced citizens or groups to “speak” 
 
Political Litmus Test in School of Social Work, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. EDUC., 
https://www.thefire.org/cases/missouri-state-university-political-litmus-test-in-school-of-social-
work (last visited July 16, 2017) (explaining that “Emily Brooker sued Missouri State University 
(MSU) after she was threatened with expulsion and charged with violating MSU’s ‘Standards of 
Essential Functioning’ for refusing to lobby the Missouri legislature on behalf of homosexual adop-
tion”); Rhode Island College: Violation of Student’s Freedom of Conscience, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. 
EDUC., https://www.thefire.org/cases/rhode-island-college-violation-of-students-freedom-of-con-
science (last visited July 23, 2017) (explaining that “[a]t Rhode Island College, graduate student Bill 
Felkner was asked to publicly advocate ‘progressive’ social changes that he did not believe in.  [His] 
. . . professor . . . suggested . . . that if he did not agree with the school’s political philosophy, he 
should consider leaving . . . .”); Nathan Rubbelke, Student Whistleblower: Diversity Class Presents Multiple 
‘isms’ as Fact Without Allowing Debate, THE COLLEGE FIX (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.thecol-
legefix.com/post/31130 (examining a UMass Amherst course that requires students to “act out 
examples of racism to prove America is racist . . . [and] dominated by ‘white privilege’” without 
opportunity for discussions or debates). 
 9 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (stating that “the action of the 
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on 
their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amend-
ment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control”). 
 10 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”). 
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in some manner.  These case lines include instances of (1) “true” compelled 
speech; (2) compelled association with third parties; (3) compelled statements 
of fact; and (4) compelled subsidizing of the speech of others.  Although the 
first three lines are the ones most often implicated in the public university 
classroom, a brief overview of all four lines is valuable for contextual purposes. 
1.  “True” Compelled Speech 
Barnette was the first of three “true” compelled speech cases addressed by 
the Court.  In these cases, the government requires an individual or organiza-
tion to personally express an ideological, state-approved message to which the 
speaker objects.  In Barnette, the Court held that the First Amendment pre-
vented the State of West Virginia from compelling public-school children to 
say the Pledge of Allegiance and salute the flag.11  It explained that the Bill of 
Rights “guards the individual’s right to speak his own mind” by precluding the 
state from coercing him “to utter what is not in his mind.”12  The Court further 
reasoned that the compulsory pledge and salute exceeded the state’s power 
because it invaded the “individual freedom of mind” by forcing the students to 
affirm a belief.13  Many First Amendment controversies require the drawing of 
fine distinctions, but the Court made it clear that this was not such a case: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no offi-
cial, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nation-
alism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by 
word or act their faith therein.14 
Barnette thus stands as a powerful confirmation of the limits of civil power over 
the realm of ideas: The state may not purposefully compel its citizenry to 
affirm government-approved opinions. 
Thirty-three years later, in its second true compelled speech case, the 
Court clarified the reach of Barnette when it reviewed a Jehovah’s Witness 
couple’s challenge to a New Hampshire criminal law that required citizens 
to carry the State motto—“Live Free or Die”—on car license plates.15  The 
majority in Wooley v. Maynard reaffirmed that the “right to refrain from speak-
ing” is part of the “individual freedom of mind” protected by the First 
Amendment.16  Accordingly, individuals may “hold a point of view different 
 
 11 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. 
 12 Id. at 634. 
 13 Id. at 637. 
 14 Id. at 642. 
 15 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1977) (“The issue on appeal is whether the State of 
New Hampshire may constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against persons who cover the 
motto ‘Live Free or Die’ on passenger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their 
moral and religious beliefs.”). 
 16 Id. at 714 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637). 
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from the majority” and “refuse to foster . . . an idea they find morally objec-
tionable.”17  Pursuant to these principles, the Court applied strict scrutiny to 
the law and concluded that New Hampshire could not require the Maynards 
to “becom[e] the courier for [the State’s ideological] message.”18  In dissent, 
Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish Barnette on the grounds that the 
passive display of the state motto was not an affirmation of belief.19  The 
majority disagreed, holding that being forced to carry the state’s preferred 
message on one’s personal property—like being compelled to salute the 
flag—is an invasion of “the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the pur-
pose of the First Amendment . . . to reserve from all official control.”20  Thus, 
the government can neither compel citizens to personally affirm a belief (Bar-
nette) nor force them to foster a belief to third parties such that their endorse-
ment is reasonably presumed (Wooley).21  In other words, the prohibition on 
compelled speech encompasses both actual and apparent affirmations of offi-
cially coerced viewpoints. 
The Court affirmed the breadth of this prohibition by holding that even 
indirect compulsion could transgress the First Amendment.  In AID v. Alliance 
for Open Society International, Inc.,22 the Court reviewed a congressional funding 
condition that required recipients to “explicitly agree with the Government’s 
policy to oppose prostitution and sex trafficking.”23  The Court found that 
this condition violated the basic principle in Barnette and Wooley that the “free-
dom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must 
say.”24  The fact that the recipients could turn down the funds did not save 
the condition because it amounted to a “pledge [of] allegiance to the Gov-
ernment’s policy of eradicating prostitution.”25  Furthermore, the majority 
reprimanded the government for crossing the constitutional red line drawn 
in Barnette—i.e., that no state official can prescribe orthodox thought and 
 
 17 Id. at 715. 
 18 Id. at 717. 
 19 Id. at 720–21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Barnette is distinguishable because the New 
Hampshire law did not “force[ ]” the Maynards to “‘assert[ ] as true’ the message” on the license 
plate). 
 20 Id. at 715 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). 
 21 Id. at 721 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“For First Amendment principles to be implicated, the State 
must place the citizen in the position of either apparently to, or actually ‘asserting as true’ the mes-
sage.”). 
 22 See generally Agency for Int’l Dev. (AID) v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 
(2013) (“The Policy Requirement compels as a condition of federal funding the affirmation of a 
belief that by its nature cannot be confined within the scope of the Government program.  In so 
doing, it violates the First Amendment and cannot be sustained.”). 
 23 Id. at 2327. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 2332. 
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force a citizen to affirm it.26  After AID, it is clear that this constitutional pro-
scription extends to direct and indirect means of coercion.   
Barnette, Wooley, and AID confirm that the government will face strict scru-
tiny if by direct or indirect action it forces its citizens to affirm an ideological 
view, whether or not that is the government’s avowed purpose. 
2.  Compelled Association 
In the second line of cases, the Court explained that the compelled speech 
doctrine also prohibits the government from forcing citizens to host or ac-
commodate a message expressed by a private third party, absent a compel-
ling state interest.27  Thus, the Court voided a state “right of reply” statute 
requiring any newspaper that criticized a political candidate to publish the 
candidate’s response free of charge.28  Likewise, a plurality of the Court en-
joined a state regulation that required a privately owned utility company to 
carry in its billing envelopes the bulletin of one of its opponents.29  These 
compelled access provisions transgressed First Amendment limits because 
they “force[d] speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they 
[did] not set.”30  The Court essentially treated the forced association with the 
objectionable message as a direct assault on the content of the speaker’s mes-
sage.  And the First Amendment leaves the “choice[ ] of what to say and 
what to leave unsaid”31 to the individual, not the government or a third party. 
The Justices affirmed this speaker-autonomy principle in Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston wherein the state applied its 
public accommodation law to require parade organizers to include a lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual (“LGB”) contingent to march in the annual St. Patrick’s 
Day Parade.32  The Court found that this forced inclusion of the contingent 
 
 26 See id. (declaring that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein” (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642)). 
 27 See, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 19 (1986) (“Notwithstanding that 
it burdens protected speech, the Commission’s order could be valid if it were a narrowly tailored 
means of serving a compelling state interest.”); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 
260–61 (1974) (White, J., concurring) (“To justify this statute, Florida advances a concededly im-
portant interest of ensuring free and fair elections by means of an electorate informed about the 
issues.  But prior compulsion by government in matters going to the very nerve center of a newspa-
per—the decision as to what copy will or will not be included in any given edition—collides with 
the First Amendment.”). 
 28 Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 244, 258.   
 29 See Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 20–21 (finding that the “order [was] not a narrowly tailored means of 
furthering a compelling state interest”). 
 30 Id. at 9. 
 31 Id. at 11. 
 32 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1995). 
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group would alter the expressive content of the organizer’s parade33 and 
thereby compromise “the speaker’s right to autonomy over the message.”34  
The choice of a speaker not to affirm a particular belief or viewpoint is pre-
sumed to “lie beyond the government’s power to control.”35  Failing to find 
a compelling governmental justification, the unanimous Court held the law 
unconstitutional as applied.36  These cases teach us that the state cannot force 
a speaker to accommodate a third party’s speech when it is so closely con-
nected to the original speaker that it will alter his preferred message by mak-
ing it appear that he endorses the third party’s ideas. 
3.  Compelled Statements of Fact 
The Court has also recognized that the speaker’s right to control his 
speech “applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorsement, 
but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid.”37  The 
seminal “compelled facts” case is Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North 
Carolina, Inc.,38 in which the Court addressed a state law that required profes-
sional solicitors to disclose their fee to prospective patrons prior to an appeal 
for funds.39  Holding that the provision acted as a content-based speech reg-
ulation, the Court applied strict scrutiny and voided the law.40 
On its face, the application of strict scrutiny to compelled statements of 
fact would seem to invalidate innumerable federal and state regulatory pro-
grams that require the disclosure of purely factual information.  Examples 
such as tax returns, product-labeling laws, environmental disclosures, and cor-
porate filings come readily to mind.41  Perhaps recognizing Riley’s breadth, the 
 
 33 Id. at 573. 
 34 Id. at 576. 
 35 Id. at 575. 
 36 Id. at 578. 
 37 Id. at 573. While the difference between facts and opinions may not always be clear, the Court has 
made this distinction in the compelled speech context as well as other First Amendment contexts.  
Most notably, the law makes this distinction in the defamation setting where “statement[s] on mat-
ters of public concern must be provable as false before there can be liability under state defamation 
law.”  Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990).  Conversely, “a statement of opinion 
relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false factual connotation 
will receive full constitutional protection.” Id. at 20. 
 38 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797–98 (1988) (finding that both 
“compelled statements of opinion” and “compelled statements of fact” burden constitutionally pro-
tected speech). 
 39 Id. at 784 . 
 40 Id. at 798, 803. 
 41 See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 316 (1st Cir. 2005) (Boudin, C.J., con-
curring) (“So-called ‘compelled speech’ may under modern Supreme Court jurisprudence raise a 
serious First Amendment concern where it effects a forced association between the speaker and a 
particular viewpoint.  What is at stake here, by contrast, is simply routine disclosure of economically 
significant information designed to forward ordinary regulatory purposes—in this case, protecting 
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Justices appear to have narrowed the decision’s reach somewhat without over-
ruling it.  The Court has since explained that Riley demanded strict scrutiny 
because the compelled disclosure there acted as a “prior restraint[ ] on 
[speech]” that would effectively kill the solicitation before it began.42  And 
three years later, the Court applied a narrow reading of Riley to an Act of 
Congress.  In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (FAIR), the 
Court upheld a funding condition that required universities receiving federal 
aid to provide military recruiters access to students to the same extent as other 
employers.43  Citing to Riley, an association of law schools that opposed the 
military’s antidiscrimination policies sued, claiming that the condition forced 
them to “speak” by sending emails and flyers on behalf of the recruiters.44  
However, the Court found these “compelled statements of fact” to be a “far 
cry from the compelled speech in Barnette and Wooley” because the schools 
were not required to endorse a “Government-mandated pledge or motto.”45  
Accordingly, the Court did not apply any form of heightened scrutiny, but 
simply affirmed the government’s choice as a reasonable one.46 
Similarly, in other cases regulating commercial speech, both the Supreme 
 
covered entities from questionable PBM business practices.  There are literally thousands of similar 
regulations on the books—such as product labeling laws, environmental spill reporting, accident 
reports by common carriers, SEC reporting as to corporate losses and (most obviously) the require-
ment to file tax returns to government units who use the information to the obvious disadvantage 
of the taxpayer.  The idea that these thousands of routine regulations require an extensive First 
Amendment analysis is mistaken.” (first citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); then citing 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974))); Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 
832, 849 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The State may not constitutionally require an individual to disseminate 
an ideological message, but requiring a provider of storm sewers that discharge into national waters 
to educate the public about the impacts of stormwater discharge on water bodies and to inform 
affected parties, including the public, about the hazards of improper waste disposal falls short of 
compelling such speech.  These broad requirements do not dictate a specific message.  They require 
appropriate educational and public information activities that need not include any specific speech 
at all.” (footnote omitted) (citing Wooley, 430 U.S. at 713)); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 
F.3d 104, 116 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Finally, we note the potentially wide-ranging implications of [plain-
tiff’s] First Amendment complaint.  Innumerable federal and state regulatory programs require the 
disclosure of product and other commercial information.  To hold that the Vermont statute is in-
sufficiently related to the state’s interest in reducing mercury pollution would expose these long-
established programs to searching scrutiny by unelected courts.  Such a result is neither wise nor 
constitutionally required.” (citations omitted)). 
 42 See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 612, 616 (2003) (interpret-
ing Riley to hold that requiring charities to disclose fees at the beginning of a telephone call could 
prompt the answerer to hang up, ending the conversation as soon as it began). 
 43 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Inst’l Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 52, 60 (2006) (“Because the First Amend-
ment would not prevent Congress from directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access re-
quirement, the statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal 
funds.”). 
 44 Id. at 62 (“As FAIR points out, these compelled statements of fact . . . , like compelled statements 
of opinion, are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.”). 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 59–60. 
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Court and courts of appeals have permitted the government to require state-
ments of fact without a compelling justification.47  Riley is still good law, but 
the federal judiciary seems hesitant to apply its full force unless the compelled 
disclosure acts as a prior restraint in a noncommercial context.  Thus, com-
pelled disclosures of fact are somewhat less likely to prompt strict scrutiny 
than compelled affirmations of belief. 
However, even compelled factual disclosures that might not trigger strict 
scrutiny under the compelled speech doctrine can raise additional concerns 
that may require heightened scrutiny under other constitutional provisions.  
Indeed, the Court has provided guidance on “compelled facts” cases—
although not stylized as such—in which the coercion infringed upon, among 
others, the rights of association, privacy, and due process.  For example, in 
NAACP v. Alabama, the High Court overturned a state court order requiring 
the local chapter of the NAACP to disclose its membership lists to the state.48  
The unanimous Court held that the forced release of such factual infor-
mation must be “subject to the closest scrutiny”49 because it would effectively 
restrain the “freedom to associate” and “privacy in one’s associations.”50  
Similarly, in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, the Court reviewed Arizona’s decision 
to deny an applicant’s admission to the bar for refusing to answer questions 
about whether she had, in the past, associated with certain political organi-
zations.51  The Court paused to note that Arizona’s inquiry likely implicated 
several constitutional provisions, but that it clearly violated her First Amend-
ment rights.52  Because the compelled factual disclosures touched upon her 
associations and beliefs, they had to be justified by compelling interests.53  
 
 47 See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), wherein the Court did 
not apply strict scrutiny in upholding ethical rules requiring attorneys to disclose clients’ potential 
liability for legal costs. 
We do not suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the advertiser’s First 
Amendment rights at all.  We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure 
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech.  
But we hold that an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure re-
quirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers. 
  Id. (emphasis added); see also supra note 41 (noting various cases in which the courts of appeals refused 
to apply strict scrutiny to state-mandated factual disclosures). 
 48 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958) (“[S]tate action which may 
have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.”). 
 49 Id. at 461.  “We turn to the final question whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in ob-
taining the disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which 
we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise by petitioner’s members of 
their constitutionally protected right of association.  Such a ‘. . . subordinating interest of the State 
must be compelling.’” Id. at 463 (citations omitted). 
 50 Id. at 462. 
 51 See generally Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1971). 
 52 Id. at 5 (“[W]hether or not there are other provisions [of the Constitution] that protect her, we think 
the First Amendment does so here.”). 
 53 Id. at 6–7 (“When a State seeks to inquire about an individual’s beliefs and associations a heavy 
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Likewise, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Court examined a legislative inquiry 
into a college professor’s political associations and the content of his lec-
tures.54  Because these questions required him to reveal facts about his asso-
ciations and beliefs, the court applied close scrutiny and voided the inquiry 
as a violation of the professor’s right to due process.55 
NAACP, Baird, and Sweezy serve as just a few reminders that the deference 
sometimes afforded to officials who force factual disclosures under the com-
pelled speech doctrine may give way if the coercion triggers other constitu-
tional protections. 
4.  Compelled Funding 
In the final and most extensive line of compelled speech cases, the Court 
has reviewed government attempts to force individuals to pay for the speech 
of others—for example, through mandatory union dues,56 compelled regula-
tory advertising,57 and mandatory student fees.58  The Court has often, but 
not exclusively, applied heightened scrutiny59 to such efforts based on its con-
clusion that the First Amendment prevents the government from “compel-
ling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.”60  
Instrumental in the Court’s position has been Thomas Jefferson’s opinion 
that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation 
 
burden lies upon it to show that the inquiry is necessary to protect a legitimate state interest.”). 
 54 See Sweezy v. New Hampshire ex rel. Wyman, 354 U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (“This case . . . brings before 
us a question concerning the constitutional limits of legislative inquiry.”). 
 55 Id. at 254; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75 (1976) (confirming the Sweezy Court applied strict 
scrutiny by citing to the Sweezy decision). 
In considering this provision we must apply the same strict standard of scrutiny, for the 
right of associational privacy developed in NAACP v. Alabama derives from the rights of the 
organization’s members to advocate their personal points of view in the most effective way.  
  Id. (citations omitted). 
 56 See, e.g., Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298 (2012); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty 
Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of 
Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  
 57 See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005); United States v. United Foods, Inc., 
533 U.S. 405 (2001); Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997). 
 58 See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 221 (2000). 
 59 See, e.g., Knox, 567 U.S. at 310 (“We made it clear that compulsory subsidies for private speech are 
subject to exacting First Amendment scrutiny and cannot be sustained unless two criteria are met.  
First, there must be a comprehensive regulatory scheme involving a ‘mandated association’ among 
those who are required to pay the subsidy.  Such situations are exceedingly rare because, as we 
have stated elsewhere, mandatory associations are permissible only when they serve a ‘compelling 
state interes[t] . . . that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associa-
tional freedoms.’” (citations omitted)); Southworth, 529 U.S. at 221 (holding that a public university 
may charge its students a mandatory fee to fund extracurricular student speech if the program is 
viewpoint neutral). 
 60 United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410. 
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of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.”61  This line of cases 
provides an additional limit on the government’s power to impose objection-
able ideological viewpoints upon its citizens. 
This overview of cases shows just how expansive and powerful are the 
protections of the compelled speech doctrine.  Except in rare circumstances, 
the courts presume that the government has acted unconstitutionally when 
it compels its citizens to speak.  This is true of purposeful attempts to force a 
citizen to affirm a belief as well as seemingly innocent ones that can change 
a citizen’s message.  The doctrine prohibits both direct and indirect govern-
ment coercion, and it protects citizens who are actually speaking as well as 
those who communicate only through association or symbolism.  The com-
pelled speech doctrine thus provides a strict line over which the government 
can rarely cross. 
B.  Compelled Speech in the College Classroom 
The principles gleaned from these cases provide broad protection for cit-
izens to determine when and what they will speak free from government in-
trusion.  How do these principles apply, however, when a student enters a 
college classroom?  The Supreme Court has cautioned that the First Amend-
ment “must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.’”62  The judiciary has, in some cases, interpreted this maxim 
to permit substantial deference to the academic decisions of university fac-
ulty.  And such deference might seem uniquely appropriate in the compelled 
speech context, given that students are regularly required to speak as a part 
of the educational process.  Only three federal courts of appeals have sought 
to resolve this apparent constitutional conflict between the rights of students 
and the prerogatives of university educators. 
The Eleventh Circuit answered this question efficiently in Keeton v. Ander-
son-Wiley by effectively foreclosing the availability of compelled curricular 
speech claims altogether.63  Officials in Augusta State University’s graduate 
counseling program imposed a curricular “remediation plan” upon first-year 
student Jennifer Keeton in response to her classroom comments indicating 
that she would not provide gay-affirming therapy to homosexual clients due 
to her Christian beliefs.64  The remediation plan required Keeton to attend 
 
 61 Keller, 496 U.S. at 10 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234–35 n.31). 
 62 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines In-
dep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).  
 63 Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 874 (11th Cir. 2011).  The author represented Jennifer 
Keeton at the district court level. 
 64 Id. at 867. 
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sensitivity training, to study resources aimed at improving counseling effec-
tiveness with the GLBTQ population, to interact with members of that pop-
ulation, and to write monthly reflection papers about “what she learned” 
from her experiences and how they “influenced her beliefs.”65  Based upon 
these reflections, the faculty would “decide the appropriateness of her con-
tinuation in the counseling program.”66  Keeton refused to complete the re-
mediation plan and instead filed suit, alleging that the plan violated the First 
Amendment by compelling her to affirm the state’s orthodoxy on sexual eth-
ics.67  The Eleventh Circuit declined to enjoin the remediation plan, holding 
that this curricular mandate involved no coercion because Keeton “volun-
tarily enrolled” at ASU.68  The court’s blunt treatment of Keeton’s claim is 
troubling.  Logically, this principle would preempt compelled speech 
claims—and many other constitutional claims—as soon as any student 
chooses to matriculate.69  Thus, the door appears to be tightly shut against 
compelled curricular speech claims in the Eleventh Circuit. 
The Tenth Circuit opened the door slightly for such claims in Axson-Flynn 
v. Johnson.70  Professors at the University of Utah threatened to remove Chris-
tina Axson-Flynn from the Actor’s Training Program for refusing to say cer-
tain offensive words when performing assigned scripts.71  Axson-Flynn sued 
the university, alleging that the school’s requirement that she read her lines 
as written—including those words offensive to her Mormon faith—consti-
tuted impermissible compelled speech.72  Relying on Hazelwood School District 
v. Kuhlmeier,73 the court of appeals determined that Axson-Flynn’s speech was 
“school-sponsored speech” which the university could regulate as long as it 
did so for “legitimate pedagogical” reasons.74  The court thus determined 
that Hazelwood’s minimal scrutiny would apply to all student speech claims 
 
 65 Id. at 870. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 871. 
 68 Id. at 878. 
 69 The court emphasized that the compelled speech doctrine announced in Barnette is simply “inappli-
cable” where enrollment is optional.  Id. at 878.  Keeton was free to “choose a different career” but 
once she chose ASU, she lost her right to challenge any aspect of the curriculum.  Id.  “ASU has 
conditioned participation in the clinical practicum and graduation on compliance with the ACA 
Code of Ethics, and Keeton, having voluntarily enrolled in the program, does not have a constitutional 
right to refuse to comply with those conditions.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See also Joseph J. Martins, First 
Amendment Enclave: Is the Public University Curriculum Immune from the Sweep of the Compelled Speech Doctrine?, 
50 TULSA L. REV. 157, 186–92 (2014) (further explaining the legal consequences of the Keeton 
court’s reasoning). 
 70 See generally Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 71 Id. at 1282. 
 72 Id. at 1280. 
 73 Id. at 1289–90. 
 74 Id. 
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that “occur[ ] in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”75  Therefore, 
while the Tenth Circuit recognizes compelled curricular speech claims, col-
lege students bringing such claims can only prevail if they can show that the 
curricular requirement is merely a pretext for discrimination.76 
In Ward v. Polite, the Sixth Circuit concurred that Hazelwood is the proper 
judicial standard for courts to apply to all university curricula that compel 
student speech.77  There, Eastern Michigan University (“EMU”) officials ex-
pelled Julea Ward from the graduate counseling program when she re-
quested the option to refer a client seeking gay-affirming counseling during 
her third-year practicum.78  After exhausting her administrative remedies, 
Ward sued, claiming that university officials violated the compelled speech 
doctrine by forcing her to speak EMU’s preferred ideological position on 
sexual counseling to a third party.79  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the 
practicum was part of EMU’s curriculum and, therefore, the court would 
only disturb the expulsion decision if the defendants’ actions were not “rea-
sonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”80  Consequently, “it is 
the rare day when a student [in the Sixth Circuit] can exercise a First Amend-
ment veto over [the curriculum].”81 
This survey of compelled curricular speech jurisprudence might cause a 
plaintiff’s lawyer to pause before agreeing to sue on Abigail or Lauren’s behalf.  
However, such concern is premature, because the heavy-handed approach 
taken in these appellate court cases is inaccurate and unjustified; curricular 
measures that compel college students to speak should be subject to a more 
rigorous and nuanced analysis.  This Article now turns to that approach. 
II.  THE COMPELLED CURRICULAR SPEECH FRAMEWORK 
A court reviewing a claim that a public university compelled an objecting 
student to speak as part of a curricular mandate should employ the following 
analysis: 
1. Is the purpose of the challenged activity to compel the student to 
affirm a belief? 
 
 75 Id. at 1289. 
 76 See id. at 1287 (“So long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in the classroom in the name 
of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class, 
religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere.”) (quoting Settle v. Dickson 
Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995)). 
 77 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012).  The author represented Julea Ward at the 
district court level. 
 78 Id. at 730. 
 79 Id. at 732. 
 80 Id. at 732, 740–41. 
 81 Id. at 734. 
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If “yes,” the court must apply strict scrutiny.  If “no,” go to 2. 
2. Is the effect of the challenged activity such that the listeners would 
reasonably presume the student was endorsing a belief? 
If “yes,” the court must apply strict scrutiny.  If “no,” go to 3. 
3. Does the challenged activity impinge upon another constitu-
tional right? 
If “yes,” the court must apply the scrutiny appropriate for that 
right.  If “no,” go to 4. 
4. Is the challenged activity a mere pretext for discrimination, or 
does it further a “legitimate pedagogical” interest? 
If the former, the assignment fails, but if the latter, the assign-
ment will be upheld. 
This framework is clearly more demanding than the one employed by 
the Tenth and Sixth Circuits (not to mention the Eleventh).  Assignments 
that actually (Step 1) or apparently (Step 2) compel affirmation of belief will 
face the most exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment.  The assignment 
must be the “least speech-restrictive means” of furthering a “compelling—or 
extremely strong—governmental interest.”82  This is scrutiny with real teeth.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court mused in Barnette that it could not conceive of a 
governmental interest that would justify the school’s officially coerced en-
dorsement of an ideology.83  Similarly, in Ward, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
that EMU’s expulsion of Ward would not survive strict scrutiny.84  Specifi-
cally, the court of appeals found the university’s interests in teaching the rel-
evant code of ethics and maintaining its accreditation insufficient to justify its 
“no-referral policy.”85  Moreover, even if the university could have proffered 
a sufficiently “compelling interest,” that interest would not have justified the 
expulsion because accommodating Ward’s religious scruples would have 
been a less restrictive means of furthering the school’s concerns.86  Other 
universities would almost surely fail this judicial standard because, as Justice 
Souter has opined, such scrutiny “leaves few survivors.”87 
 
 82 DAVID L. HUDSON, JR., Legal Almanac: The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech § 2.2, in LEGAL 
ALMANAC SERIES (2012). 
 83 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there are any circumstances 
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”). 
 84 Ward, 667 F.3d at 740 (“The university does not argue that its actions can withstand strict scrutiny, 
and we agree.  Whatever interest the university served by expelling Ward, it falls short of compel-
ling.”). 
 85 Id. at 740. 
 86 Id. at 740 (“Allowing a referral would be in the best interest of Ward (who could counsel someone 
she is better able to assist) and the client (who would receive treatment from a counselor better 
suited to discuss his relationship issues).”). 
 87 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 455 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Curricular exercises that implicate constitutional interests beyond com-
pelled speech (Step 3) may also face heightened scrutiny.  As discussed above, 
even when a university compels mere statements of fact, it may trample the 
rights of association, privacy, and due process.  A curricular exercise that 
operates in this manner will also rarely survive. 
However, this framework need not be insurmountable.  Public educators 
may require students to state facts or opinions as long as such curricular man-
dates do not compel affirmation of belief, violate other constitutional rights, 
or target students for discrimination.  Indeed, the majority of curricular in-
teractions and assignments would easily survive this analysis.  The deferential 
approach employed by the Sixth and Tenth Circuits was surely motivated 
by a desire to prevent unduly burdening the teaching methods of university 
educators.  But this obtuse methodology overlooks a body of legal precedent 
confirming that curricular measures that compel college students to speak 
should be subject to a more demanding and detailed analysis.  This Article 
will now address that precedent. 
III.  PRECEDENT SUPPORTING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
This Article’s primary contribution to this issue relates to Steps 1 and 2, 
because they reverse the circuit courts’ presumption of the constitutionality 
of university curricula.  These steps subject curricular exercises to strict scru-
tiny when they force students to actually or apparently affirm a belief.  Ac-
cordingly, the majority of this section will be dedicated to discussing the prec-
edent that justifies such exacting scrutiny.  Moreover, these two inquiries will 
be considered together because—as will be discussed below—they are simply 
different forms of the same type of constitutional invasion.  This section will 
also discuss the legal support for Step 3, simply to point out that a court must 
be aware that compelled statements of fact or opinion could implicate other 
constitutional concerns beyond compelled speech.  Finally, because some 
compelled curricular speech directives do not implicate the constitutional in-
terests protected by Steps 1 through 3, this section will partially concur with 
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits’ application of Hazelwood for Step 4 claims. 
A.  Steps 1 and 2: Compelled Affirmations of Belief 
1.  Barnette and Wooley 
The pre-eminent precedent supporting the application of strict scrutiny to 
curricula that compel students to affirm a belief is Barnette itself.  In fact, the 
case is on all fours, so to speak.  Barnette addressed a compelled speech claim in 
which a public educational institution forced students to affirm an ideological 
viewpoint as part of a curricular mandate.  In this context, the Court made it 
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clear that judges must apply no less than the most rigorous judicial scrutiny. 
While the Barnette decision addressed a grade-school compulsion, the de-
cision applies even more forcefully to public institutions of higher learning, 
due to the unique nature of the university and the maturity of the students.88  
It is axiomatic that universities hold a distinctive place in our constitutional 
heritage that requires special constitutional protection.  The “college class-
room with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”89  
This marketplace is necessary to generate new ideas to drive both innovation 
and public policy so that our society will not “stagnate and die.”90  For this 
environment to function properly, college students are granted maximum free-
dom of thought and inquiry.91  Indeed, the “vigilant protection of constitu-
tional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.”92  There is simply no room for the view that such freedoms “apply 
with less force on college campuses” than they do in primary and secondary 
school classrooms.93  Moreover, minors roam the halls of K-12 public schools 
while university campuses are inhabited almost exclusively by adults.  The 
First Amendment rights of schoolchildren “are not automatically coextensive 
with the rights of adults in other settings.”94  For this reason, public secondary 
and elementary schools “are granted more leeway” to regulate student 
speech than public colleges and universities.95  The rights of the former serve 
as a constitutional floor under which no government schools may tread.  
Therefore, if public school administrators have any power to compel speech, 
their university counterparts have less.  Speech regulations that fail in the 
pre-collegiate school context must fail in the university setting.  Consequently, 
if Barnette is good law for primary and secondary schools, by logical extension, 
it must be good law for public universities.96 
 
 88 See Martins, supra note 69, at 182 (“While the Barnette opinion was issued in the pre-collegiate con-
text, the nature of the environment and the age of the students in higher education both cut in favor 
of extending Barnette’s reasoning to the university setting.”). 
 89 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of 
N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). 
 90 Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957). 
 91 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 835 (1995) (“[The] danger 
[of chilling speech] is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a back-
ground and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our intellectual and philo-
sophic tradition.”). 
 92 Healy, 408 U.S. at 180 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)). 
 93 Id. at 180. 
 94 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 95 DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Sypniewski 
v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 260 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 96 Furthermore, it is not uncommon for federal courts to apply pre-collegiate precedent to the colle-
giate environment.  For example, the Axson-Flynn and Ward courts of appeals utilized Hazelwood v. 
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Barnette also explains the limits the compelled speech doctrine imposes 
upon state-mandated curriculum.  While some subsequent courts and com-
mentators have attempted to characterize Barnette as noncurricular, such at-
tempts falter in light of the facts of the case and the Supreme Court’s current, 
broad understanding of what constitutes a school’s “curriculum.”97  In Bar-
nette, West Virginia specifically adopted the pledge in response to the Gobitis 
decision in which the Supreme Court previously upheld the ceremony as a 
permissible application of Pennsylvania’s “educational policy.”98  The West 
Virginia legislature amended its education statutes to require all schools to 
include “courses of instruction in history, civics, and in the Constitutions of 
the United States and of the State ‘for the purpose of teaching, fostering and perpetu-
ating the ideals, principles and spirit of Americanism, and increasing the knowledge 
of the organization and machinery of the government.’”99  The Board of Ed-
ucation then implemented the flag salute as “a regular part of the program of 
activities in the public schools” in order to comply with this directive.100  When 
the board created its “program of activities” in order to “teach[ ], foster[ ], 
and perpetuat[e]”101 patriotic principles for the purpose of “increasing . . . 
knowledge,”102 it was patently employing its curriculum.  The Supreme Court 
has since implicitly confirmed this conclusion by explaining that a school’s 
curriculum is broadly defined: “[A]ctivities may fairly be characterized as part 
of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom 
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to 
 
Kuhlmeier—a decision rendered in the high school context—to derive a judicial standard for com-
pelled speech claims in the university setting.  See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262; Ward v. Polite, 
667 F.3d 727, 733–34 (6th Cir. 2012); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 
2004).  This specific application was flawed, as explained more fully in Subpart IV.B., infra, because 
the Tenth and Sixth Circuits applied Hazelwood as a ceiling—rather than a floor—on the rights of 
college students.  Nevertheless, these decisions demonstrate that court opinions applicable to sec-
ondary school students can be pertinent to university students as long as the unique nature of the 
university and the maturity of its students is appropriately considered. 
 97 See, e.g., Ward, 667 F.3d at 734.  The Ward court opined that First Amendment protection for student 
speech varies depending upon how closely it is related to the curriculum.  Id.  The more student 
speech has to do with the curriculum, the less it is protected.  Id.  Conversely, the less speech has to 
do with the curriculum, the less likely it is that schools will be able to justify its restriction.  Id.  The 
Sixth Circuit then concluded that the speech involved in Barnette was essentially noncurricular, and 
was for that reason entitled to greater constitutional protection.  Id.  “Barnette involved forced indi-
vidual expression that happened to occur in a school, while Hazelwood involved restricted student 
expression through the school’s newspaper.”  Id.   
 98 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 598 (1940), overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (“The wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by those 
compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our independent 
judgment. . . . [T]he courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational policy.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 99 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625 & n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941)).  
 100 Id. at 626 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 101  Id. at 625 n.1 (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941)).  
 102  Id. (quoting W. VA. CODE § 1734 (1941)).  
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impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audi-
ences.”103  The pledge and salute imposed upon the Barnette children plainly 
fit this description.  Pennsylvania and West Virginia school officials, as well as 
the Justices in Gobitis104 and Barnette, all recognized the pledge and salute cer-
emony for what it was: a mandatory curricular exercise.105 
The curricular nature of the pledge, however, did not constrain the ma-
jority from applying strict judicial scrutiny.  Unlike the Axson-Flynn and Ward 
courts, the High Court plainly rejected any form of deferential analysis: 
The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well in-
clude . . . power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have 
a ‘rational basis’ for adopting.  But freedoms of speech and of press, of as-
sembly, and of worship may not be infringed on such slender grounds.  They 
are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests 
which the state may lawfully protect.106 
The Justices went even further by reasoning that when the state compels 
speech it must provide “even more immediate and urgent” justification than 
 
 103 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988). 
 104 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940) (“But it is a very different thing for this 
Court to exercise censorship over the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or exercise 
will best promote in the minds of children who attend the common schools an attachment to the 
institutions of their country.”). 
 105 At least one commentator has challenged the notion that the pledge was an academic exercise 
because the Barnette majority “made a point of indicating that the school board ‘did not adopt the 
flag salute because it was claimed to have educational value.’”  See James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court 
and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1413 (2000) (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 n.12).  Yet, 
this position overlooks the immediate and overall context in which the footnote was given, both of 
which confirm the Court was addressing the state’s power to educate.  Regarding the former, the 
Court placed the footnote in the middle of its explanation that the school could not “short-cut” the 
process of “teaching by instruction and study” with a “compulsory salute and slogan.”  Barnette, 319 
U.S. at 631.  And the footnote itself cited to research challenging the effectiveness of the pledge as 
an educational tool. Id. at 631 n.12.  Moreover, the Barnette Court framed the entire context of its 
opinion as a re-visitation of the decision in Gobitis to defer to the state’s “educational policy.”  Gobitis, 
310 U.S. at 598, overruled by W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
The Gobitis decision, however, assumed, as did the argument in that case and in this, that 
power exists in the State to impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in gen-
eral. . . . The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a cere-
mony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the in-
dividual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under 
our Constitution.  We examine rather than assume existence of this power and, against 
this broader definition of issues in this case, re-examine specific grounds assigned for the Gobitis 
decision. 
  Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635–36 (second emphasis added).  If Barnette addressed a non-curricular exer-
cise, there would have been no need to re-examine Gobitis.  Barnette, however, expressly addressed 
the constitutional limits to public schools’ authority over curricular policy.  Therefore, the position 
that West Virginia did not adopt the pledge as part of the curriculum is simply untenable.  Footnote 
twelve, in this light, simply stands for the proposition that the Barnette Court recognized the man-
datory pledge as an ineffective educational method. 
 106 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 639 (emphasis added); see also id. at 633–34 (“But here the power of compulsion 
is invoked without any allegation that remaining passive during a flag salute ritual creates a clear 
and present danger that would justify an effort even to muffle expression.”). 
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when it silences speech.107  And the Court confessed that it was unaware of any 
instance in which the state could coerce adoption of a belief in the educa-
tional context.108  Barnette thus commands the application of at least strict 
scrutiny to curricula that impel student speech. 
Of course, this is not entirely surprising given that, historically, most com-
pelled speech regulations have faced heightened examination.109  What is 
critical for purposes of this Article is to discern what precisely triggers this 
standard in the public university curricular context—a context in which 
three federal circuit courts have found little or no scrutiny to be appropriate.  
The Barnette majority explained that this threshold question must be ad-
dressed as a matter of power, and the state generally lacks the power to com-
pel its citizens to affirm a belief.110  In other words, any authority the state 
may have to educate terminates at the point at which the state forces some-
one to affirm an ideology.111  It is at this point that the state impermissibly 
“invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First 
Amendment . . . to reserve from all official control.”112 
While intrusions of this sort may take many forms, the Supreme Court has 
categorized two forms of compelled affirmations that presumptively violate the 
First Amendment.  These invasions are represented in Steps 1 and 2, respec-
tively, of the proposed framework.  The first form was present in Barnette itself 
because West Virginia purposefully coerced its students to revere the United 
States government by word and symbol.113  The school system was free to 
teach the students about American history and government, but it was not at 
liberty to intentionally command patriotism through a mandatory pledge and 
 
 107 Id. at 633. 
 108 Id. at 642 (“If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to 
us.”). 
 109 See supra Subparts I.A.1–4. 
 110 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (“We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute 
and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 111 Id. at 635–36.  As the Court stated in Barnette: 
It is not necessary to inquire whether non-conformist beliefs will exempt from the duty to 
salute unless we first find power to make the salute a legal duty.  The Gobitis decision, 
however, assumed, as did the argument in that case and in this, that power exists in the State 
to impose the flag salute discipline upon school children in general.  The Court only ex-
amined and rejected a claim based on religious beliefs of immunity from an unquestioned 
general rule.  The question which underlies the flag salute controversy is whether such a 
ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may be imposed upon the 
individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization un-
der our Constitution.  We examine rather than assume existence of this power and, against 
this broader definition of issues in this case, re-examine specific grounds assigned for the 
Gobitis decision. 
  Id. 
 112 Id. at 642. 
 113 Id. at 633 (“Here it is the State that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as 
presently organized.  It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of 
the political ideas it thus bespeaks.”). 
106 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
salute backed by administrative and criminal penalties.  The school’s purpose 
to force each student to affirm a belief was plain in that each student who did 
not “pledge allegiance to the Flag”114 faced expulsion and rendered their parents 
liable to prosecution for truancy.115  But this official purpose was fatal because 
it “transcend[ed] constitutional limitations” on the state’s authority.116  Simi-
larly, a public university presumptively may not employ its curriculum for the 
purpose of coercing a student to affirm an ideological view. 
The second type of presumptively invalid coercion (represented in Step 
2) arose in Wooley where the law required drivers to serve as “mobile bill-
board[s]” for the state’s motto.117  The Wooley Court held that the regulation 
failed to advance any compelling state interest.118  The majority explained 
further that New Hampshire’s regulation would fail even if it was supported 
by a legitimate purpose119 because it was simply another form of the compul-
sion prohibited in Barnette.120  This state mandate forced the Maynards to 
disseminate the state’s ideological motto in a way that others would reason-
ably perceive as conveying the Maynards’ endorsement.121  This often occurs 
 
 114 Id. at 628 (emphasis added). 
 115 Id. at 629 (stating that students who failed to conform would be expelled and their parents would 
be subject to criminal prosecution for truancy). 
 116 Id. at 642. 
 117 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977). 
 118 Id. at 716–17. 
 119 Id. As the Court stated in Wooley: 
 Even were we to credit the State’s reasons and “even though the governmental purpose be 
legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle 
fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.  The breadth 
of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the 
same basic purpose.” 
  Id. (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)). 
 120 Id. at 715 (“Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement 
upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the 
difference is essentially one of degree.”). 
 121 This is not to be confused with the “reasonable observer” in Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement” 
test for Establishment Clause cases.  See Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 
481, 493 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Con-
nor, J., concurring).  In the compelled speech context, the concern is that viewers will mistakenly 
associate the plaintiff with a government-imposed message which the plaintiff opposes.  While the 
Court has not fully developed this reasonable association principle, it has provided a guidepost and 
a few examples of its application.  In Hurley, the Court explained that this misattribution can occur 
when the plaintiff is “intimately connected” with the government-imposed message.  See Hurley v. 
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995).  The Court 
has found sufficient potential for misattribution present to trigger strict scrutiny when speakers were 
forced to carry the government’s message on their private property (Wooley), distribute another’s 
message in their envelopes (Pacific Gas), and include an unwelcome contingent of marchers within 
their private parade (Hurley).  On the other hand, the Court has explained that persons are not likely 
to associate government messages on United States currency with the carrier, Wooley, 430 U.S. at 
717 n.15, nor would the private messages expressed by patrons at a shopping mall be attributed to 
the mall’s owner.  See Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980).  Additionally, 
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when the “dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a 
speaker intimately connected with the communication advanced.”122  In the 
Court’s view, forcing a citizen to “be an instrument for fostering public ad-
herence”123 to an offensive viewpoint gives the appearance of endorsement.  
And such forced association is as constitutionally objectionable as if the gov-
ernment overtly intended to compel the citizen to adopt that viewpoint, be-
cause, in the eyes of the listeners, the speaker has in fact adopted that view-
point.124  Strict scrutiny is thus also triggered when government action has 
the effect of compelling a citizen to convey the government’s ideology to oth-
ers where it might be reasonably perceived to be the citizen’s own message.   
Barnette and Wooley, therefore, provide the threshold inquiries for review-
ing compelled curricular speech claims at public universities.  In Barnette, the 
Court explained that public schools will face strict scrutiny when they utilize 
their curriculum for the purpose of compelling affirmation of an orthodoxy.  
Likewise, Wooley clarified that the government will face this same scrutiny, 
notwithstanding the government’s purpose, when it impels a citizen to speak 
an orthodox view to others if that message could be reasonably attributed to 
the citizen.  The Wooley Court’s extension of Barnette to public highways im-
plies that this type of forced association could occur both inside and outside 
the traditional classroom.  The First Amendment therefore requires courts 
to examine both the purpose (Step 1) and the effect (Step 2) of curricular man-
dates that compel student speech.  When such mandates compel students 
either to actually or apparently affirm a state-preferred position on a matter of 
opinion, the reviewing court must apply strict scrutiny. 
2.  Companion First Amendment Provisions 
The strict scrutiny standard is likewise supported by companion provi-
sions contained in the Constitution.  Indeed, the Barnette majority refused to 
limit its decision to the free exercise claim brought by the plaintiffs, but rather 
decided to rest its decision on broader First Amendment principles.125  Fed-
eral courts often consider related provisions of the First Amendment when 
 
the Court found that simply permitting military recruiters on campus could not be viewed as en-
dorsement of the military’s antidiscrimination policies.  Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. and Inst. 
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64–65 (2006).  These cases suggest that the Court’s threshold for potential 
misattribution is set quite low in order to prevent the risk of endangering speaker autonomy. 
 122 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576. 
 123 Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715. 
 124 See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 63 (“The compelled-speech violation in each of our prior cases, however, 
resulted from the fact that the complaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was 
forced to accommodate.”). 
 125 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634–35 (1943) (“While religion supplies appellees’ 
motive for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share 
these religious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual.”). 
108 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
addressing a First Amendment claim.126  Accordingly, it is entirely appropri-
ate to examine companion lines of First Amendment jurisprudence to deter-
mine how courts should address compelled curricular speech claims.  An 
analysis of the religion clauses, their historical roots, and the freedom of as-
sociation confirms that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for review-
ing curricular mandates that compel college students to affirm a belief or 
profess a belief to others. 
a.  The religion clauses 
The religion clauses preclude the government from “mak[ing] [a] law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”127  The Establishment Clause stops the civil government from en-
gaging in activities that fall within the realm of religion, while the Free Ex-
cercise Clause “protects against the danger that civil government will inter-
fere with or even persecute those exercising their religious liberties.”128  
Scholars and judges have fiercely debated for decades the precise protections 
encompassed by these clauses.  However, the Supreme Court has provided 
at least one immovable guidepost: The right to believe and profess a religious 
belief is absolute.  “The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, 
the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.  Thus, 
the First Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation of re-
ligious beliefs as such.’  The government may not compel affirmation of religious 
belief. . . .”129  The Court has said the same with respect to the Establishment 
Clause: “The ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment 
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can . . . force 
[a person] to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.  No person can be punished 
for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs . . . .”130 
This point deserves emphasis.  While the government may sometimes in-
fringe upon religiously motivated conduct when regulating private citizens, it 
may not punish mere belief or the profession of belief.131  Government actions 
 
 126 See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1971) (noting that the free exercise of religion, 
the freedom of conscience, the freedom of speech, the right peaceably to assemble and petition, and 
the freedom of association were considerations in the Court’s analysis). 
 127 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 128 Jeffrey C. Tuomala, The Casebook Companion pt. 9, ch. 1, at 1 (Feb. 13, 2017) (unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author). 
 129 Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1993) (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 130 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (emphasis added). 
 131 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940) (“Thus the Amendment embraces two con-
cepts,—freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the 
second cannot be.”).  Of course, there are spheres in which it might be necessary, and thus appro-
priate, for the government to regulate some beliefs to a limited extent.  For example, when a citizen 
leaves the private sphere and becomes a public official, the Constitution itself requires the public 
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that compel belief or profession of belief are thus subject to the strictest judicial 
scrutiny under the religion clauses.  It would seem that the same scrutiny 
would be appropriate for government actions that compel affirmation of belief 
under the Free Speech Clause.  Indeed, this is the central holding of Barnette. 
This principle can be traced back to the efforts of Thomas Jefferson and 
James Madison to secure religious liberty in Virginia.  The Supreme Court 
and most legal scholars have recognized their writings in this context as being 
foundational to the protections embodied in the First Amendment religion 
clauses.132 
Jefferson wrote the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom in order to 
disestablish the Anglican Church in Virginia.  He opened his draft bill with 
a fundamental tenet: “Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all at-
tempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil inca-
pacitations . . . are a departure from the plan of the holy author of our reli-
gion . . . .”133  Jefferson reasoned from this principle that the Virginia 
government could not compel its citizens to support the Anglican Church 
because the government has no authority whatsoever to govern in the realm 
of opinions.  Indeed, Jefferson argued, the civil magistrate who does so im-
mediately “destroys all religious liberty.”134  Significantly, Jefferson leaves no 
room for any potential governmental interest that might justify such a severe 
intrusion into the conscience. 
Madison concurred with Jefferson’s views in his efforts to prevent Vir-
ginia from adopting a bill to provide public support to “teachers of the Chris-
tian religion.”135  In his famous “Memorial and Remonstrance,” Madison 
asserted, “[W]e hold it for a fundamental and undeniable truth, ‘that religion 
or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of discharging it, 
can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence.’”136  
Madison argued that this “unalienable right” to religious liberty extended to 
the “opinions of men” and thus encompassed “a freedom to embrace [and] 
 
servant to take an oath or affirmation that he will uphold and defend the Constitution.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (requiring the President of the United States of America to take an oath or 
affirmation prior to entering office); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (stating that Senators and Repre-
sentatives, as well as all members of the state legislatures and “all executive and judicial [o]fficers” 
are “bound by [o]ath or [a]ffirmation.”).  
 132 Tuomala, supra note 128, pt. 9, ch. 1, at 2. 
 133 Thomas Jefferson, 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, FOUNDERS ONLINE (June 18, 1779), 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02-0132-0004-0082. 
 134 Id. 
 135 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (June 
20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 1784–1786, 298–99 (Robert A. Rutland 
et al., eds., 1973).  This principle is now enshrined in Article I, § 16 of the Virginia Constitution.  
VA. CONST. art. I, § 16. 
 136 Id. at 299. 
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to profess” one’s religion free from government interference.137  Conse-
quently, Madison contended that Virginia lacked the power to compel men 
to furnish financial support for the teachers of one religion or religion in gen-
eral.138  Like Jefferson, Madison shut the door on any potential for legitimate 
government rule over the opinions of men. 
Jefferson and Madison, therefore, both concluded that religious liberty 
exists because the civil government does not have jurisdiction over the beliefs 
and opinions of men.  This maxim finds even deeper roots in classical schools 
of jurisprudence.  Thomas Jefferson famously relied upon the “Laws of Na-
ture and of Nature’s God” in the Declaration of Independence as the justifi-
cation for breaking with England and the foundation of our unalienable 
rights.139  Under this classical view, government authorities are empowered 
to protect society by “execut[ing] wrath on him who practices evil.”140  How-
ever, governing officials are consequently limited in that they may only pun-
ish evil works.  Matters of the heart or mind—including the opinions of men—
are not external actions, and therefore simply lie beyond the authority of the 
government to punish.  In Jefferson’s own words, “the opinions of men are 
not the object of civil government nor under its jurisdiction.”141  The juris-
diction of the civil government does not begin until “principles break out into 
overt acts against peace and good order.”142 
 
 137 MADISON, supra note 135, at 299–300. 
 138 See id. at 300. 
Because it is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties.  We hold this 
prudent jealousy to be the first duty of Citizens, and one of the noblest characteristics of 
the late Revolution.  The free men of America did not wait till usurped power had strength-
ened itself by exercise, and entangled the question in precedents.  They saw all the conse-
quences in the principle, and they avoided the consequences by denying the principle.  We 
revere this lesson too much soon to forget it.  Who does not see that the same authority 
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the 
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects?  [T]hat the same 
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the 
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in 
all cases whatsoever? 
  Id. 
 139 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).  According to Sir William Blackstone, 
“[u]pon these two foundations, the law of nature and the law of revelation, depend all human laws; 
that is to say, no human laws should be suffered to contradict these.”  2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES *42.  Blackstone clarified that the “the revealed or divine law [is] to be found only 
in the holy scriptures” and that it takes precedence over man’s law.  Id. 
 This law of nature, being co-equal with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of course 
superior in obligation to any other.  It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at 
all times: no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid 
derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or immediately from this original. 
  Id. at *41.  
 140 Romans 13:1–4 (NKJV). 
 141 Tuomala, supra note 128, pt. 9, ch. 2, at 11. 
 142 Id.  The jurisdictional limits on forms of compelled speech were not foreign to the founders.  In fact, 
the religious test clause expressly prevented the new government from excluding persons from fed-
eral office who did not profess the religion of the majority.  See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.  Such 
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The Supreme Court has adopted the jurisdictional approach supported 
by Jefferson and Madison when reviewing governmental action that compels 
one to profess a religious belief or doctrine.  In Torcaso v. Watkins,143 for ex-
ample, the Court reviewed a provision in the Maryland Constitution that 
required public officers to “declar[e] [a] belief in the existence of God.”144  
The Court first reaffirmed that both religion clauses bar the government 
from “forc[ing] a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.”145  
The Court then held that this clear prohibition doomed the enforcement of 
the Maryland provision.146  It is significant that the Court did not apply a 
balancing test but simply struck the provision as a patently “unconstitu-
tional[ ] inva[sion] [of] the appellant’s freedom of belief and religion.”147  
This is a textbook example of the most stringent form of judicial scrutiny. 
The sources referenced above—the Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom, the Memorial and Remonstrance, ancient Scriptures, and the Torcaso 
opinion—all have obvious implications for judicial scrutiny over compelled 
speech claims.  Jefferson, Madison, and Torcaso addressed religious liberty 
violations that mirrored classic instances of compelled speech.  While Jeffer-
son and Madison battled forms of compelled subsidies, Torcaso involved 
“true” compelled speech.  Moreover, neither the historical authors nor the 
Justices seemed to permit any government justification for these intrusions.  
In fact, they have spoken with one voice when the state has sought to coerce 
a citizen to believe or profess a belief.  All such compulsions—whether they 
force one to pay for a church, support religious teachers, or profess a belief 
in God—transgress the freedom of religion because the government has no 
power to regulate the mind or the opinions of men. 
This principle would seem to operate with similar force when a public 
school compels a citizen to affirm an ideological belief or to profess that belief 
to others.  Indeed, the Barnette Court said as much when it explained that the 
 
religious loyalty tests have been condemned even by ancient writers.  For example, the Bible records 
the story of Daniel, who refused to obey King Darius’s law mandating that all persons must pray 
only to the King.  See Daniel 6:6–9 (NKJV).  Daniel was cast into the lion’s den for disobeying this 
archetypical compelled speech law.  See id. at 6:16.  After being released, Daniel explained to King 
Darius: “My God sent His angel and shut the lions’ mouths, so that they have not hurt me, because 
I was found innocent before Him; and also, O king, I have done no wrong before you.”  Id. at 6:22 
(emphasis added).  Daniel explained to Darius that he had done no civil wrong because the King 
had no jurisdiction to command the duty of worship from him; this duty was owed only to God, 
and as Madison would affirm, could “be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence.”  MADISON, supra note 135, at 299. 
 143 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). 
 144 Id. at 489 (quotations omitted). 
 145 Id. at 495 (quotations omitted). 
 146 Id. at 496. 
 147 Id. 
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plaintiffs’ religious scruples were part of a broader “liberty of the individ-
ual,”148 and the Torcaso Court cited to Barnette for support.149  The West Vir-
ginia Board of Education thus had no more power to compel religious stu-
dents to affirm a belief than it did students who merely objected on 
philosophical grounds.  Therefore, when public education officials invade the 
mind in this manner, their actions must be subject to the strictest judicial 
scrutiny, whether the plaintiff brings a free exercise, establishment clause, or 
compelled speech claim. 
b.  Freedom of association 
The Supreme Court’s freedom of association jurisprudence also supports 
the application of strict scrutiny to compelled affirmations of belief, whether 
actual or apparent.  The Court has recognized that implicit in the First 
Amendment is the “right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety 
of political, social, economic, educational, religious and cultural ends.”150  
This right is burdened when the government “forces [a] group to accept 
members it does not desire,” and the forced inclusion “impair[s] the ability 
of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to 
express.”151  This type of government interference can only be justified when 
the action “serve[s] compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression 
of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive 
of associational freedoms.”152  In this respect, the freedom of association op-
erates as a bar to prevent group compelled speech.  Essentially, the freedom 
of association mirrors the compelled speech doctrine by preventing the gov-
ernment from coercing a group to express an unwanted message.  That this 
type of intrusion into the inner structure of a group is presumed to be uncon-
stitutional strongly implies that the same principle can be applied when the 
state invades the mind of an individual. 
Hurley clearly illustrates this point.  There, the Court explained why the 
forced inclusion of an unwanted LGB contingent into a private parade vio-
lated the speech rights of the parade organizers.  The lower state courts con-
cluded that the public accommodations law did not seek to burden expres-
sion but simply to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation.153  The 
Justices unanimously disagreed.  The forced participation of the LGB con-
tingent “would likely be perceived” as a message of support for its cause,154 
 
 148 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 635 (1943). 
 149 Torcaso, 367 U.S. at 492 n.7. 
 150 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (quotation and citation omitted). 
 151 Id. at 648 (quotation and citation omitted). 
 152 Id. (quotation and citation omitted). 
 153 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 563 (1995). 
 154 Id. at 575. 
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and this apparent association violated the parade organizers’ right to auton-
omy over their own speech.155  Moreover, the Court considered that the state 
might have applied its public accommodation law to the parade for the pur-
pose of “produc[ing] speakers free of . . . biases.”156  But if this were the state’s 
objective, then it was a “decidedly fatal” one.157 
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce 
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, 
grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a pro-
posal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.  The Speech 
Clause has no more certain antithesis.158 
Accordingly, the Hurley Court held that the freedoms of speech and of as-
sociation were implicated whether the purpose of the law was to require the 
speakers to adopt a pro-LGB viewpoint or whether the mere effect was to com-
municate such a view to others.  Either way, the state’s attempts to impose an 
ideology upon the parade organizers were presumptively unconstitutional.159 
Hurley’s lessons for compelled speech jurisprudence are palpable.  The 
state has no more power to compel a group to affirm a government-approved 
idea than it does an individual.  The textbook example of this occurs when 
the purpose of state action is to compel private citizens to affirm an ideolog-
ical belief with which they disagree (Step 1).  But this also occurs when the 
government forces private citizens to disseminate an offensive idea to others 
such that it reasonably appears that those citizens endorse the idea (Step 2).  
Hurley thus prohibited actual and apparent imposition of an orthodoxy, and it 
relied heavily on Barnette to reach this conclusion.  This citation signifies that 
the compelled affirmation ban applies just as potently in the public school 
classroom as it does in the public square. 
A review of the principles underlying the compelled speech doctrine, the 
religion clauses, and the freedom of association yields but one conclusion: The 
government presumptively lacks the power to compel affirmation of an idea.  
From Jefferson to Madison and from Barnette to Hurley, the authoritative voices 
interpreting the principles of the First Amendment have consistently con-
demned state action that either (a) compels dissenters to affirm a belief or (b) 
coerces them to associate with a belief in a way that makes it appear that they 
have adopted that belief as their own.  Whether the state has applied such 
 
 155 Id. at 576 (“Thus, when dissemination of a view contrary to one’s own is forced upon a speaker 
intimately connected with the communication advanced, the speaker’s right to autonomy over the 
message is compromised.”). 
 156 Id. at 579. 
 157 Id.  
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 574–75 (1995) (“The parade’s organizers may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to 
be so, or they may object to unqualified social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other 
reason for wishing to keep GLIB’s message out of the parade.  But whatever the reason, it boils 
down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is 
presumed to lie beyond the government’s power to control.”). 
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force to secondary school students, taxpayers, car drivers, public servants, or 
members of a parade, the law has demanded the strictest judicial scrutiny. 
College students are entitled to no less protection in the college class-
room.  Consequently, a court reviewing a compelled curricular speech claim 
must apply strict scrutiny if the curricular measure purposefully or effectively 
compels a student to affirm an ideology under Step 1 or 2. 
B.  Step 3: Other Constitutional Provisions 
Of course, many curricular exercises that require student speech will by-
pass Steps 1 and 2 of the proposed analysis because they do not force students 
to affirm a belief.  Nonetheless, such exercises can still severely impinge upon 
other precious constitutional liberties.  For example, an assignment in a hu-
man sexuality course that requires students to write a paper discussing the 
number of sexual partners they have had would likely survive Steps 1 and 2.  
Likewise, a political philosophy professor who requires his students to stand 
up in class and reveal who they voted for in the last election could also escape 
these steps.160  Neither exercise forces the students to adopt an orthodoxy, 
yet these assignments would certainly implicate—at a minimum—the “free-
dom to associate” and “privacy in one’s associations.”161 
These exercises are readily analogous to the type of coerced inquiries the 
Supreme Court condemned in NAACP, Baird, and Sweezy, discussed supra in 
Subpart I.A.3.  In each of those cases, the Court reviewed the compelled 
disclosure under the scrutiny appropriate to the relevant constitutional pro-
vision.  Likewise, the Ward and Axson-Flynn courts followed this approach 
 
 160 There could be some debate here whether this question compels statements of fact or opinion.   On 
the one hand, the student’s choice of candidate in the last election is a verifiable fact.  On the other 
hand, that “fact” is related to the student’s political opinions and beliefs.  This question would be 
similar to the inquiry in Baird in which the state bar applicant was asked if “she had ever been a 
member of the Communist Party or any organization ‘that advocates overthrow of the United 
States Government by force or violence.’”  Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1971).  The 
plurality characterized the question as an inquiry about her “beliefs and associations.”  Id. at 6–7.  
Therefore, it is safe to say that compelled disclosures of fact about one’s beliefs, opinions, and/or associa-
tions, can activate other constitutional protections. 
 161 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).  A public institution may not require 
a student to reveal intimate medical or sexual facts to the class as part of an academic exercise.  The 
Third Circuit touched on this privacy limitation when it addressed a school survey that sought 
“intimate and private” information from students regarding “sexual activity, drug and alcohol use 
and relationships.”  See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 180 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
court rejected the school’s threshold argument that, because it was mandated by the state to teach 
about many of these topics, no constitutional claim could be made.  “The scope of the right to 
privacy is defined by the Constitution and may not be restricted by a state legislature or by state 
education officials.”  Id. at 178.  However, the court ultimately concluded that no privacy interests 
were implicated because there was no official compulsion and the survey results were completely 
anonymous. Id. at 189.  This liberty from compelled private facts in the curricular context is signif-
icant and requires further inquiry by the court when it is raised. 
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when addressing the plaintiffs’ claims that their respective universities forced 
them to speak words that violated their religious freedom.  The Sixth162 and 
Tenth163 Circuits appropriately subjected the challenged exercises to the 
scrutiny required by the Free Exercise Clause.  One can easily imagine a 
number of other rights that could be at risk from such curricular mandates.  
Consequently, a complete framework for analyzing compelled curricular 
speech claims must encompass the protection of these additional freedoms. 
C.  Step 4: Catchall 
Curricular exercises that require students to speak but do not force them 
to affirm beliefs and do not implicate other liberties may be subject to Hazel-
wood as held by the Ward and Axson-Flynn courts.164  Most assignments will 
fall into this category.  These curricular exercises will satisfy this step as long 
as they further “legitimate pedagogical” purposes and are not employed as a 
“pretext for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class, reli-
gion or political persuasion.”165  However, Hazelwood cannot be blindly ap-
plied to the university classroom.  This standard operates as a constitutional 
baseline for liberty of speech in the university context.  As discussed in Sub-
part III.A.1., the freedom of inquiry and thought available to adults in the 
university classroom can be no less than the liberty afforded to minors in 
primary and secondary schools.  If high school teachers cannot target stu-
dents for discrimination, then neither can college professors.  So, for exam-
ple, a teacher who required an African-American student to use a racial slur 
in a class exercise would likely fail this test whether the assignment took place 
in a grade school or university classroom. 
While this standard is quite deferential to educators in general, a stricter 
version of it must be utilized in academia to account for the special nature of 
the university and the maturity of its students.  University professors have 
significantly less control over student speech than their grade-school col-
leagues do.166  A legitimate pedagogical concern in a high school government 
 
 162 Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that strict scrutiny was appropriate 
because the university’s “no-referral policy” was not “neutral and generally applicable”). 
 163 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1297–99 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that summary judgment 
on plaintiff’s free exercise claim was not appropriate because plaintiff adequately raised a genuine 
issue as to whether the university maintained a policy of “individualized exemptions”). 
 164 Ward, 667 F.3d at 733–34; Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289. 
 165 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287 (citations omitted); see also Ward, 667 F.3d at 734 (“Although educators 
may ‘limit[ ]’ or ‘grade[ ] speech in the classroom in the name of learning,’ and although they may 
control their own speech and curriculum, the First Amendment does not permit educators to invoke 
curriculum ‘as a pretext for punishing [a] student for her . . . religion.’”) (citations omitted). 
 166 McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I., 618 F.3d 232, 247 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Public universities have signifi-
cantly less leeway in regulating student speech than public elementary or high schools.”).  Due to 
the substantial differences between the university and the primary/secondary school context, the 
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class may not be legitimate in a college political science course.  So while 
Hazelwood offers teachers some discretion when regulating student speech, 
the standard has more teeth in the university classroom.167 
IV.  CONCEPTUAL OBJECTIONS 
The proposal that a curricular requirement can face strict scrutiny when 
it compels a student to affirm a belief (Steps 1 and 2) obviously has its chal-
lengers, and in this case those challengers include three federal courts of ap-
peals.  The opposing arguments raised by these courts and other commenta-
tors calling for minimal or deferential judicial review roughly fall into four 
categories.  The first and most radical argument maintains that students 
waive their right to challenge the curriculum when they voluntarily accept 
the benefit of a state-supported education.  The second and more modest 
position insists that the state should have greater control over the curricu-
lum—including student responses to curricular assignments—because it is a 
form of government speech.  A related, pragmatic challenge maintains that 
the educational process itself would collapse if public educators cannot com-
pel student speech.  The final challenge asserts that judges should defer to 
academic decisions that oblige student speech because they lack the expertise 
to adequately review such decisions.  However, any surface appeal to these 
various arguments vanishes upon closer examination because they fail to 
overcome the aforementioned weight of authority demanding strict scrutiny 
for curricular mandates that force students to affirm an ideology. 
A.  No Cause of Action 
In Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, the Eleventh Circuit asserted the position that 
students simply have no grounds to bring a compelled speech claim against a 
 
McCauley court emphasized that the Third Circuit has not adopted Hazelwood as a stand-alone meas-
ure for addressing student speech claims in the university setting.   Id.  The Ninth Circuit has simi-
larly refused to apply Hazelwood’s student speech test to the university setting.  See Oyama v. Univ. 
of Haw., 813 F.3d 850, 863 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 167 See McCauley, 618 F.3d at 247. 
Public universities have significantly less leeway in regulating student speech than public 
elementary or high schools.  Admittedly, it is difficult to explain how this principle should 
be applied in practice and it is unlikely that any broad categorical rules will emerge from 
its application.  At a minimum, the teachings of Tinker, Fraser, Hazelwood, Morse, and other 
decisions involving speech in public elementary and high schools, cannot be taken as gos-
pel in cases involving public universities.  Any application of free speech doctrine derived 
from these decisions to the university setting should be scrutinized carefully, with an em-
phasis on the underlying reasoning of the rule to be applied. 
  Id. 
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public university’s curriculum.168  The Keeton court reasoned that public uni-
versities condition access to state-supported education upon fulfilling the cur-
riculum, and a student who “voluntarily enroll[s]” in a public university “does 
not have a constitutional right to refuse to comply with those conditions.”169  
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling effectively forecloses compelled curricular 
speech claims and directly challenges the entire model proposed in this Article. 
The first problem with the Keeton court’s “voluntary enrollment” theory is 
that it violates over half a century of constitutional jurisprudence.  It was true 
in the first half of the twentieth century that citizens might waive some of their 
constitutional rights as a condition of receiving certain government privileges, 
such as funding, employment, or education.170  But this so-called “rights-priv-
ilege” doctrine eventually yielded to the rule that government “may not deny 
a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected 
interests—especially his interest in freedom of speech.”171  The triumphant 
“unconstitutional conditions” doctrine is now firmly established and serves as 
a bedrock of First Amendment freedom.172  The voluntary enrollment theory 
is simply a thinly veiled return to the rights-privilege jurisprudence that the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly rebuffed in multiple settings, including the ac-
ademic context.  Indeed, in the landmark Tinker decision, the Court explained 
that the state is not free to “impose and enforce any conditions that it chooses 
upon attendance at public institutions of learning.”173  If the state cannot im-
pose a constitutional waiver on high school students, it surely cannot do so to 
prospective college students.  The voluntary enrollment concept simply fails 
as a viable solution because it lacks the force of law. 
The second fatal flaw in the Keeton position is that, taken to its logical 
conclusion, it would jeopardize all constitutional freedoms in academia.174  
For the voluntary enrollment notion has no principled limitation, nor did the 
Eleventh Circuit suggest one.  If by enrolling at a public university a student 
automatically waives her right to be free from compelled speech, then the 
university could force her to lobby for legislation, campaign for a political 
candidate, or pledge allegiance to a particular state-endorsed viewpoint.  And 
why does her enrollment decision not also effectively waive all of her other 
First Amendment rights, like her freedom to worship, her right to assemble 
 
 168 Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 878–79 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 169 Id. at 878. 
 170 See generally Martins, supra note 69, at 171–75. 
 171 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972). 
 172 By 1972, the Supreme Court stated this principle had been firmly established for “at least a quarter-
century.”  Id.  Accordingly, the doctrine has been a constitutional fixture for at least seventy years. 
 173 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 n.2 (1969). 
 174 See generally Martins, supra note 69, at 186–92. 
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peaceably, and her right to petition her government for redress of griev-
ances?175  Moreover, on what grounds would other rights—such as due pro-
cess, privacy, and equal protection—be safe?  The simple answer is that no 
liberty would be secure, for “[i]f the state may compel the surrender of one 
constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel 
a surrender of all.”176  Such a constitutional forfeiture would be unthinkable 
anywhere, but it is particularly so on the public university campus, which is 
the quintessential “marketplace of ideas.”177 
The Eleventh Circuit erred when it held that compelled curricular speech 
claims should receive no federal remedy.  The holding violates established 
First Amendment law and calls into question virtually all student liberty on 
campus.  For these reasons, the Keeton court’s voluntary enrollment theory 
cannot stand as a viable challenge to the model proposed in this Article. 
B.  Government Speech 
A more serious contender may be found in the assertion that a public uni-
versity’s curriculum is a form of government speech178 over which educators 
may exercise substantial control.179  This argument relies heavily on the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Hazelwood.  This contention recognizes that student 
 
 175 See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 176 Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926). 
 177 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (quotation omitted). 
 178 See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Curriculum choices are a form of school 
speech . . . .”). 
 179  A more extreme form of this argument contends that the government has total control over the 
curriculum, including student responses thereto.  But this argument is quickly laid to rest.  Some 
federal courts have recognized that the curriculum is a form of government speech.  And the Su-
preme Court has strongly implied that First Amendment protection for extracurricular student speech 
would not be the same were the government speaking through its curriculum. 
Our decision ought not to be taken to imply that in other instances the University, its 
agents or employees, or—of particular importance—its faculty, are subject to the First 
Amendment analysis which controls in this case.  Where the University speaks, either in 
its own name through its regents or officers, or in myriad other ways through its diverse 
faculties, the analysis likely would be altogether different.  The Court has not held, or 
suggested, that when the government speaks the rules we have discussed come into play. 
  Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 234–35 (2000) (citation 
omitted) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983)). 
However, student responses to curricular requirements are student speech, not government 
speech, and are therefore not subject to total state control.  Logic alone tells us that students do not 
become state speakers simply by attending public schools.  If this were the case, students would 
become the mouthpiece of the state every time they spoke pursuant to a class assignment.  Accord-
ingly, when the professor grades such speech, she would actually be evaluating the institution rather 
than the student.  This is simply not the reality of the college classroom.  Instead, the law has fol-
lowed logic and courts have recognized that “[t]hings that students express in class or in assignments 
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responses to curricular assignments are a form of student speech but maintains 
that the school must be free not to promote certain student speech related to the 
curriculum because it bears the “imprimatur” of the university.180  Federal 
courts, under this view, must only apply minimal judicial scrutiny when public 
university officials exercise editorial control over the content of such “school-
sponsored” student speech.181  Applying this standard broadly, the Axson-Flynn 
and Ward appellate courts ruled that a university official may compel curric-
ular student speech as long as that decision is “reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns”182 and not a “pretext” for discrimination.183 
 
when called upon to express their own views . . . do not represent ‘the [school’s] own speech.’”  See 
C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 214 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); accord Ha-
zelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988) (recognizing both that the produc-
tion of the student newspaper was part of the school’s curriculum but also that the articles written 
by the students were “student speech”); Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734–35, 738 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(recognizing that a student’s request for a referral to not provide counseling in a university counsel-
ing clinic that contradicted her religious beliefs was student speech); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 
F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that lines delivered in a student play were student 
speech); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a master’s thesis was 
student speech).  And the law has accordingly not granted schools absolute authority over such 
speech, requiring instead that public educators justify curricular decisions with at least “legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”  See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; Ward, 667 F.3d at 733; Axson-Flynn, 356 
F.3d at 1285; Brown, 308 F.3d at 948.  Consequently, a public university does not have absolute 
curricular authority to force its students to affirm offensive beliefs. 
 180 The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student 
speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from the question whether 
the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech.  
The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a student’s personal expression 
that happens to occur on the school premises.  The latter question concerns educators’ 
authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to 
bear the imprimatur of the school. 
  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71. 
 181 The third type of speech is “school-sponsored speech,” which is “speech that a school ‘af-
firmatively . . . promotes,’ as opposed to speech that it ‘tolerates.’”  “‘Expressive activities 
that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the 
imprimatur of the school’ constitute school-sponsored speech, over which the school may 
exercise editorial control, ‘so long as [its] actions are reasonably related to legitimate ped-
agogical concerns.’”  We conclude that Axson-Flynn’s speech in this case constitutes 
“school-sponsored speech” and is thus governed by Hazelwood. 
  Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1285 (citations omitted). 
 182 Ward, 667 F.3d at 733 (“Public educators may limit ‘student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.’”); see 
also Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1289 (“Accordingly, we hold that the Hazelwood framework is applicable 
in a university setting for speech that occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”). 
 183 See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1287 (“So long as the teacher limits speech or grades speech in the 
classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext for punishing the student for her race, 
gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not interfere.” 
(quoting Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995))); see also Ward, 667 F.3d 
at 734 (“Although educators may ‘limit[ ]’ or ‘grade[ ] speech in the classroom in the name of 
learning,’ and although they may control their own speech and curriculum, the First Amendment 
does not permit educators to invoke curriculum ‘as a pretext for punishing [a] student for her . . . re-
ligion.’  Even in the context of a secular university, religious speech is still speech, and discriminating 
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The Tenth and Sixth Circuits erred by applying this deferential test as 
the standard for all compelled curricular speech claims because they failed to 
recognize the critical difference between compelled speech and compelled 
silence.  The courts adopted this test from Hazelwood, in which the Supreme 
Court rebuffed a claim that high school officials violated the First Amend-
ment when they refused to publish various student essays in the school news-
paper.184  Hazelwood, however, addresses curricular censorship rather than cur-
ricular compelled speech.  The circuit courts erred by assuming that the two 
were equivalent, and in doing so, overlooked controlling authority holding 
that they are conceptually distinct.185  Indeed, Barnette expressly distinguished 
between compelled silence and compelled speech when it overturned West 
Virginia’s curricular pledge requirement: 
It is now a commonplace that censorship or suppression of expression of 
opinion is tolerated by our Constitution only when the expression presents a 
clear and present danger of action of a kind the State is empowered to pre-
vent and punish.  It would seem that involuntary affirmation could be commanded only 
on even more immediate and urgent grounds than silence.186 
The circuit courts did not need to stretch Hazelwood to manufacture a stand-
ard for compelled speech in the college classroom, for the Supreme Court 
 
against the religious views of a student is not a legitimate end of a public school.” (citations omitted)). 
 184 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263–64 (holding that school officials deleting two pages of the school news-
paper because of decency concerns did not violate the First Amendment). 
 185 It is true that the Supreme Court has paid lip service to the idea that compelled speech and com-
pelled silence are constitutionally equivalent.  In Riley, the Court stated the following: 
There is certainly some difference between compelled speech and compelled silence, but 
in the context of protected speech, the difference is without constitutional significance, for 
the First Amendment guarantees “freedom of speech,” a term necessarily comprising the 
decision of both what to say and what not to say. 
  Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796–97 (1988). 
 However, the Court here was not eliminating the conceptual differences between compelled 
speech and compelled silence.  Rather, the Court made this comment in direct response to North 
Carolina’s contention that it had greater power to compel speech than to silence it.  Understood in 
this context, the Court’s statement simply affirmed that the freedom from compelled speech is en-
titled to no less protection than the freedom from censorship.  See also Brandon C. Pond, To Speak 
or Not to Speak: Theoretical Difficulties of Analyzing Compelled Speech Claims Under a Restricted Speech Standard, 
10 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 149, 156 (2010).  Nora Sullivan has adeptly noted that Wooley also contra-
dicts the presumption that the “power to compel and the power to censor are coextensive.”  Nora 
Sullivan, Insincere Apologies: The Tenth Circuit’s Treatment of Compelled Speech in Public High Schools, 8 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 533, 547–48 (2010).  The Wooley Court explained that “[t]he right to speak and 
the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of ‘indi-
vidual freedom of mind.”’  Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (quoting W. Va. State 
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).  Sullivan notes that the “term complementary 
[is] defined as ‘mutually supplying each other’s lack.’”  Sullivan, supra, at 548.  Therefore, she con-
cludes, “the Supreme Court’s description of compelled speech in Wooley signals that the First 
Amendment safeguards against compulsion and censorship are not the same, but rather are two 
different pieces of a puzzle that fit together to form complete protection for free speech.”  Id.  The 
Axson-Flynn and Ward appellate courts should have recognized that the right to remain silent is pro-
tected at least as much and often to a greater degree than the right to speak.   
 186 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added). 
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already provided the proper standard in Barnette for compelled affirmations 
of belief.  There, the Court rejected the idea that public educators have as 
much latitude to compel student speech as they do to suppress it.  Barnette is 
thus more precisely applicable than Hazelwood.  And Barnette demands rigor-
ous scrutiny when public schools utilize their curricula to compel students to 
affirm a belief. 
This is not to say that Hazelwood teaches nothing about how courts should 
handle clashes between student speech and state curricula.  As discussed in Sub-
part III.C., supra, it can be a helpful baseline standard to consider when univer-
sity educators have not implicated Steps 1 through 3 of the proposed frame-
work.  Moreover, the opinion actually supports the application of strict scrutiny 
to compelled speech claims falling under Steps 1 and 2.  Hazelwood and Barnette 
together affirm the rule that both the government and its citizens must be able 
to disassociate from objectionable speech in the application of public school 
curricula.  Hazelwood addresses the first part of this equation, while Barnette ad-
dresses the second.  Thus, the two opinions complement one another. 
The chief concern of the Hazelwood majority was protecting the school 
from being forced to promote speech that it did not want to endorse.  This is 
why the Court opened its legal analysis by distinguishing between student 
speech that happens to occur on campus and “school-sponsored” student 
speech that is “part of the school curriculum.”187  Regarding the latter, the 
Justices explained that the First Amendment does not require public schools 
to “promote particular student speech.”188  Consequently, a public school 
can refuse to sponsor student speech that is “inconsistent with its ‘basic edu-
cational mission’”189—such as speech that “might reasonably be perceived to 
advocate . . . conduct otherwise inconsistent with ‘the shared values of a civ-
ilized social order,’” or that would “associate the school with . . . matters of 
political controversy.”190  The Justices opined that public educators have 
some power to regulate the content of such student speech so that “the views 
of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”191  In 
other words, the government has some authority to “disassociate itself” from 
objectionable school-sponsored student speech.192 
Hazelwood’s holding thus provides corollary support for students to like-
wise separate themselves from offensive curricular affirmations.  For if the 
 
 187 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270–71. 
 188 Id. at 270–73. 
 189 Id. at 266 (holding that “a school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its ‘basic 
educational mission’”). 
 190 Id. at 271–72 (citations omitted). 
 191 Id. at 271. 
 192 Id.; see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1986) (holding that it was 
appropriate for a public school to discipline a student in order to disassociate itself from the “vulgar  
and lewd speech” the student gave in a school assembly).  
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government has the right to distance itself from certain student views, cer-
tainly students—who are protected by the First Amendment—have no less 
right to disassociate themselves from odious government ideas.  In this light, 
Hazelwood stands as a kind of “reverse compelled speech” case that generally 
prohibits a student, in the context of a curricular assignment, from compel-
ling the school to endorse her ideas.  And this prohibition extends beyond 
actual endorsement even to student speech that “might reasonably be per-
ceived” to carry the school’s approval.193  The Hazelwood court gave public 
educators wide latitude to disassociate from such classroom speech.  Federal 
courts will only overturn those school decisions that lack a “legitimate peda-
gogical concern.”194  This places a heavy legal burden on any student wishing 
to use a curricular exercise to bootstrap school endorsement (or apparent 
endorsement) of her ideas. 
Likewise, if Hazelwood is correct, the government should face no less of a 
constitutional burden when it either seeks to compel a student to affirm a 
belief or requires that student to speak a message that could be “erroneously 
attributed” to the student.195  This heavy presumption against forced associ-
ation is akin to the strict scrutiny standard explicitly applied in Barnette and 
Wooley.  Accordingly, Hazelwood, Barnette, and Wooley complement each other 
by providing heightened protection from compulsory affirmation for both 
the public school and the student. 
If this were not the rule, we would have a serious anomaly in the law.  
The government would have greater ability to disassociate itself from views 
it does not want to endorse than private citizens would, even though private 
citizens are expressly granted the freedom of speech.  It is entirely incon-
sistent that the government would have more power to protect its speech 
than the citizens who are specifically shielded from government overreach 
by the Constitution.196  Consequently, Hazelwood’s minimal judicial scrutiny 
 
 193 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (holding that a school can “refuse to sponsor student speech that might 
reasonably be perceived to advocate . . . ‘conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared values of 
a civilized order’”). 
 194 Id. at 273 (holding that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial con-
trol over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”).  
 195 Id. at 271 (holding that educators have wider latitude in controlling student expression to make sure 
that the “views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school”).  
 196 The Barnette majority made this point precisely when it sought to resolve the question raised in 
Gobitis: “Must a government of necessity be too strong for the liberties of its people, or too weak to 
maintain its own existence?”  W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636–37 (1943). 
The Court’s answer was that individual liberty must prevail: 
Government of limited power need not be anemic government.  Assurance that rights are 
secure tends to diminish fear and jealousy of strong government, and by making us feel 
safe to live under it makes for its better support.  Without promise of a limiting Bill of 
Rights it is doubtful if our Constitution could have mustered enough strength to enable its 
ratification.  To enforce those rights today is not to choose weak government over strong 
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is not the appropriate standard for courts to apply to all compelled speech 
claims, and particularly not when public university curricula compel students 
to affirm ideas—whether directly or apparently. 
C.  Educational Necessity 
Notwithstanding Hazelwood, one could see how judges could conclude 
that a deferential standard is necessary because the educational process re-
quires professors to compel some student speech.197  The Axson-Flynn and 
Ward appellate courts justified applying Hazelwood’s judicial standard on this 
basis.  The alternative, in their opinion, would grant individual students a 
“veto” over the school’s curriculum.198  “[S]chools must be empowered at 
 
government.  It is only to adhere as a means of strength to individual freedom of mind in 
preference to officially disciplined uniformity for which history indicates a disappointing 
and disastrous end. 
  Id. at 636–37. 
 197 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (claiming “that schools must be 
empowered at times to restrict the speech of their students for pedagogical purposes is not a con-
troversial proposition”); see also Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 2012) (“All educators 
must be able ‘to assure that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach.’  
Just as a junior high school English teacher may fail a student who opts to express her thoughts 
about a once-endangered species, say a platypus, in an essay about A Tale of Two Cities, so a law 
professor may fail a student who opts to express her views about Salvador Dali and the fourth 
dimension in a torts exam.  That the First Amendment protects speech in the public square does 
not mean it gives students the right to express themselves however, whenever and about whatever 
they wish on school assignments or exams.  ‘A school need not tolerate student speech that is in-
consistent with its basic educational mission.’” (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271; then citing 
Settle v. Dickson Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir. 1995); then quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 
at 266).  A Supreme Court Justice and at least two other courts of appeals concur with this position.  
See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 242–43 (2000)  (Souter, 
J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that at a university, “students are inevitably required to 
support the expression of personally offensive viewpoints in ways that cannot be thought constitu-
tionally objectionable unless one is prepared to deny the University its choice over what to teach”); 
Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Hazelwood . . . establish[es] that—consistent with 
the First Amendment—a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a particular view-
point, even if it is a view-point with which the student disagrees, so long as the requirement serves 
a legitimate pedagogical purpose.”); Marinello v. Bushby, No. CIV. A. 1:95CV167–D–D, 1996 
WL 671410, at *14 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996) (“it is part of the function of schools to compel speech 
from students to some degree so that officials can ensure that the students are in fact learning what 
is taught”), aff’d, 163 F.3d 1356 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 198 See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292. 
The school’s methodology may not be necessary to the achievement of its goals and it may 
not even be the most effective means of teaching, but it can still be “reasonably related” to 
pedagogical concerns.  A more stringent standard would effectively give each student veto 
power over curricular requirements, subjecting the curricular decisions of teachers to the 
whims of what a particular student does or does not feel like learning on a given day.  This 
we decline to do. 
  Id. (citations omitted); see also Ward, 667 F.3d at 734 (“When a university lays out a program’s 
curriculum or a class’s requirements for all to see, it is the rare day when a student can exercise a 
First Amendment veto over them.”). 
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times to restrict the speech of their students for pedagogical purposes.”199  
Consistent with this power, schools “routinely require students to express a 
viewpoint that is not their own in order to teach the students to think criti-
cally.”200  The Axson-Flynn court provided the following examples of such per-
missible compulsion: 
[A] college history teacher may demand a paper defending Prohibition, and 
a law-school professor may assign students to write “opinions” showing how 
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia would analyze a particular Fourth Amendment 
question. . . . Such requirements are part of the teachers’ curricular mission 
to encourage critical thinking . . . and to conform to professional norms . . . .201 
Certainly, the teaching process would stall if students had a constitutional 
right to refuse to respond to such questions and assignments.  The First 
Amendment does not permit individual students to hold the learning process 
hostage.  This conclusion, at least partially, drove the Axson-Flynn and Ward 
courts to conclude that all compelled curricular speech claims are presump-
tively invalid.202 
However, what this educational-necessity argument fails to recognize is 
the critical difference between compelled comprehension and compelled affirma-
tion.  A constitutional chasm exists between “I understand” and “I believe.”  
Absent a discriminatory motive and invasion of other rights, public universi-
ties may generally require the former, but they may not mandate the latter, 
even to achieve curricular goals. Barnette explained this distinction explicitly: 
[T]he State may “require teaching by instruction and study of all in our his-
tory and in the structure and organization of our government, including the 
guaranties of civil liberty which tend to inspire patriotism and love of coun-
try.”  Here, however, we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare 
a belief.  They are not merely made acquainted with the flag salute so that 
they may be informed as to what it is or even what it means.  The issue here 
is whether this slow and easily neglected route to aroused loyalties constitu-
tionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan.203 
Educators can thus teach about a concept, such as the American flag, in order 
to increase student learning.  This power implies they may also expect stu-
dents to show through words that they comprehend the given subject matter 
in order to verify curricular objectives have been met and knowledge has 
been obtained.  For example, teachers may insist students provide facts about 
 
 199 Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 1290–91 (quoting Brown, 308 F.3d at 953). 
 202 As discussed in Subpart III.B., supra, the Ward and Axson-Flynn courts both recognized that com-
pelled student speech can raise interests protected by other constitutional rights.  Because this Arti-
cle agrees with that position, this Subpart will not emphasize it again here.  Instead, this Subpart 
will focus on challenging the position held by those courts that compelled curricular assignments 
should never face strict scrutiny under the compelled speech doctrine. 
 203 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631 (1943) (citation omitted) (quoting Min-
ersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1943)).  
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the flag on an exam to confirm their grasp of history.  Likewise, they may 
require students to orally defend a viewpoint in class regarding the flag that 
is contrary to their own to demonstrate persuasive communication skills.  But 
professors are not free to “short-cut” this “slow and easily neglected” process 
of persuasion by commanding students to adore the flag or the principles it 
represents.204  This is where the forced pledge went too far.205  While teachers 
may have authority to insist their students recite facts or even opinions to 
teach a lesson, Barnette makes clear that the line between education and in-
doctrination is crossed when teachers force students to affirm a belief.206  And 
 
 204 Id. at 631.  
 205 Id. at 640 (“National unity as an end which officials may foster by persuasion and example is not in 
question. The problem is whether under our Constitution compulsion as here employed is a per-
missible means for its achievement.”). 
 206 There is some precedent indicating that First Amendment protection is the same whether the gov-
ernment compels statements of fact or statements of opinion.  Indeed, the Axson-Flynn appellate 
court chastised the district court for holding that “statements of fact” were not entitled to protection 
from disclosure under the First Amendment.  See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1284 n.4.  The Tenth 
Circuit based its conclusion on Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, Inc., in which 
the Supreme Court reviewed a state law requiring professional solicitors to disclose to potential 
donors—before requesting funds—the percentage of such donations actually turned over to the 
charity in the last twelve months.  See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1988).  
The Court voided the law under strict scrutiny, explaining that both “compelled statements of 
opinion” and “compelled statements of fact” “burden[ ] protected speech.”  See Riley, 487 U.S. at 
797–98.  But, as Laurent Sacharoff explains, Riley did not hold that facts always receive the same 
disclosure protection as ideas: 
Rather, [Riley] held that the government could not compel canvassers to reveal facts at the 
doorstep.  But the Court expressly said the government could compel charities to reveal 
facts in a more general venue, such as directly to the state, which could then publicize them 
to the public:  
Further North Carolina may constitutionally require fundraisers to disclose certain 
financial information to the State, as it has since 1981. . . . [And] as a general rule, 
the State may itself publish the detailed financial disclosure forms it requires profes-
sional fundraisers to file.  This procedure would communicate the desired infor-
mation to the public without burdening a speaker with unwanted speech during the 
course of a solicitation.  
Riley does not prohibit compelled disclosure of facts generally; rather, it only prohibits 
compelled disclosures that are likely to suppress speech immediately as will occur on the 
doorstep or telephone solicitation. 
  Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 409–10 (2008) 
(footnotes omitted) (second alteration in original). 
However, this is not to say that the government has a blank check to compel factual disclo-
sures.  The Tenth Circuit was correct in concluding that compelled statements of fact are not ex-
empt from constitutional protection.  In the public school context, surely teachers must demon-
strate, at a minimum, a “legitimate pedagogical” interest in compelling students to reveal facts they 
may wish to hide.  A school that targets a student for disclosure based on his race, gender, religion, 
or political affiliation would collide with Hazelwood, if not the Equal Protection Clause.  Addition-
ally, Riley mandates that the state must not require factual disclosures that act as a prior restraint 
on speech.  The Ward court concurred in holding that educators may not target a student to sup-
press his speech.  See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 734 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Even in the context of a 
secular university, religious speech is still speech, and discriminating against the religious views of a 
student is not a legitimate end of a public school.”).  As discussed in Subpart III.B., supra, individuals 
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as explained above in Subpart III.A.1., Wooley confirms that this threshold is 
not only breached when the state purposefully impels a student to affirm an 
idea, but also when it otherwise requires her to “disseminate an ideology” 
such that her endorsement thereof is reasonably presumed.207  Therefore, an 
assignment that requires a student to deliver a “Why I Love the Flag” speech 
to a school assembly or a PTA meeting would—like the forced pledge—pre-
sumptively violate the First Amendment. 
Understanding the line between comprehension and affirmation reveals 
the incomplete logic in the reasoning of the Tenth and Sixth Circuits.  They 
reasoned that universities must have broad authority under the First Amend-
ment to compel all student speech in order to teach effectively, subject only 
to “legitimate pedagogical concerns.”208  This is only partially true. Public 
educators have some latitude to obligate student responses as long as they do 
not compel students actually or apparently to affirm an ideological belief un-
der Steps 1 and 2.209  When teachers merely insist that students comprehend 
a lesson—as long as they do not violate other rights under Step 3—they are 
generally entitled to a more lenient standard of review.210  However, when 
affirmation is compelled, state educators must justify their assignments under 
strict scrutiny, as required by Barnette and Wooley. 
Applying this more comprehensive approach to the Axson-Flynn court’s hy-
 
and organizations may remain silent to protect other liberty interests such as privacy and associa-
tion.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (“[W]e have repeatedly found that compelled 
disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the 
First Amendment.”).  
 207 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977). 
 208 Ward, 667 F.3d at 733 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) 
(quotations omitted); Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1290 (citations and quotations omitted).  
 209 At least one federal court of appeal has implicitly recognized this limitation on a public school’s 
curricular authority to compel student speech.  See C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159, 
187 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]hile a public educational institution may not demand that a student profess 
beliefs or views with which the student does not agree, a school may in some circumstances require 
a student to state the arguments that could be made in support of such beliefs or views.”).  However, 
because the court found that no official compulsion was present, the statement is largely dicta. Id. 
at 189. 
 210 The Hazelwood standard prevents the state from using its curriculum as a pretext to discriminate 
based on “race, gender, economic class, religion or political persuasion.”  See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d 
at 1287.  By roughly mirroring the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, it acts 
as a baseline of constitutional protection under which the government may not tread.  However, 
the Hazelwood standard does not adequately address additional constitutional concerns that may 
arise when public universities compel student speech.  As discussed in Subpart III.B., supra, forcing 
students to speak can easily trespass onto the freedom of association and the right to privacy, for 
example, even when no discriminatory purpose is present.  Therefore, even if a public educator 
compels student speech for “legitimate pedagogical” reasons, the reviewing court must still be mind-
ful of other constitutional interests.  This is simply one more reason why the blind application of 
Hazelwood to all curricular compelled speech claims is unacceptable. 
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potheticals, we can see how the prediction that heightened scrutiny will ham-
string public education is greatly exaggerated.  The theoretical history teacher 
and law professor may indeed require their respective students to write papers 
defending Prohibition, or analyzing how various justices might evaluate the 
Fourth Amendment.  Neither assignment (from the facts given) indicates that 
the professors required their students to personally affirm any ideological be-
lief about Prohibition or the Fourth Amendment.  Nor are the assignments 
given under auspices where others might reasonably perceive student en-
dorsement of any such belief, for everyone understands that these classroom 
assignments are academic in nature.  And these exercises do not (on their face) 
trespass on any other rights, such as privacy or association.  The same reason-
ing would justify most questions that elicit student opinions in a quiz, exami-
nation, or class discussion.  The Axson-Flynn and Ward courts are correct that 
when student opinions are compelled under these circumstances, strict scru-
tiny is not triggered.  However, when the school goes further and strong-arms 
a student into endorsing an idea, it treads on constitutional thin ice. 
The model proposed in this Article strikes a workable balance that respects 
the public university’s curriculum as well as students’ constitutional rights.  In 
contrast, the one-size-fits-all employment of Hazelwood proposed by the Tenth 
and Sixth Circuits fails to respect Barnette and Wooley by treating all compelled 
student speech the same.  In doing so, the appellate courts ignored the Supreme 
Court’s admonishment that “[o]bservance of the limitations of the Constitution 
will not weaken government in the field appropriate for its exercise.”211 
D.  University Deference 
A related counterargument contends that judges should defer to profes-
sors on academic matters, including, but not limited to, the implementation 
of curricular objectives.  The Supreme Court asserted this position as a gen-
eral proposition in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, in which the 
court upheld the university’s decision to remove a student from its medical 
school for academic reasons.212 
When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic deci-
sion, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty’s profes-
sional judgment.  Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a substantial 
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person 
or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.213 
 
 211 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 212 Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 227–28 (1985). 
 213 Id. at 225 (footnote omitted). 
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Several other cases214 and commentators215 affirm this general principle—
that judges should tread lightly when reviewing scholastic decisions.  This is 
due to the presumption that faculty members have greater training and com-
petence in the academic field and thus are better suited than judges to assess 
the validity of educational judgments.216  Instead, judges should avoid “sub-
stitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of . . . the 
school authorities.”217  The Axson-Flynn court relied on both Ewing and Ha-
zelwood to conclude that this same academic deference must apply when 
schools compel speech as part of a curricular assignment.218 
Whatever the merits of such deference might be in the academy, the Su-
preme Court has never granted it to teachers in a compelled speech case.  To 
 
 214 See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687 (2010) (“[The University’s] decisions about 
the character of its student-group program are due decent respect.”); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
306, 328 (2003) (“The Law School’s educational judgment that [racial] diversity is essential to its 
educational mission is one to which we defer. . . . Our holding today is in keeping with our tradition 
of giving a degree of deference to a university’s academic decisions, within constitutionally pre-
scribed limits.”); Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89–90 (1978) (“The decision to dismiss 
respondent, by comparison, rested on the academic judgment of school officials that she did not 
have the necessary clinical ability to perform adequately as a medical doctor and was making in-
sufficient progress toward that goal.  Such a judgment is by its nature more subjective and evaluative 
than the typical factual questions presented in the average disciplinary decision.  Like the decision 
of an individual professor as to the proper grade for a student in his course, the determination 
whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of cumulative in-
formation and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative deci-
sionmaking.  Under such circumstances, we decline to ignore the historic judgment of educators 
and thereby formalize the academic dismissal process by requiring a hearing.”); Bishop v. Aronov, 
926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e cannot supplant our discretion for that of the Univer-
sity.  Federal judges should not be ersatz deans or educators.  In this regard, we trust that the 
University will serve its own interests as well as those of its professors in pursuit of academic free-
dom.”). 
 215 See Judith Areen, Government as Educator: A New Understanding of First Amendment Protection of Academic 
Freedom, 97 GEO. L.J. 945, 996 (2009) (“Courts should defer to a decision made by an institution of 
higher education if the institution can show that it was made on academic grounds.”); David M. 
Rabban, A Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional” Academic Freedom Under the First Amend-
ment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 227, 287 (“[C]ourts should afford broad 
deference to professional expertise.  Academic decisions are necessarily subjective and beyond the 
competence of judges. Courts cannot . . . ‘evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic 
decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions.’”) (quoting 
Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226); Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification 
Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 412 (2013) (“Indeed, even skeptics of broad claims of univer-
sity autonomy tend to agree that universities should receive substantial deference in making core 
academic decisions.”). 
 216 Joseph J. Martins, Tipping the Pickering Balance: A Proposal for Heightened First Amendment Protection for the 
Teaching and Scholarship of Public University Professors, 25 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 687 (2016). 
 217 Martinez, 561 U.S. at 686 (citation and quotations omitted). 
 218 Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1290 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that courts must “give 
‘substantial deference’ to ‘educators’ stated pedagogical concerns’” (quoting Fleming v. Jefferson 
Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 925 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 
484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988))); see also Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292–93 (“[W]e do not second-guess 
the pedagogical wisdom or efficacy of an educator’s goal . . . .”). 
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the contrary, the Supreme Court has flatly rejected the notion that such def-
erence would be appropriate when educators prescribe orthodox thought.  
In Barnette, the majority took pains to condemn Gobitis’ assertion that “this is 
a field ‘where courts possess no marked and certainly no controlling compe-
tence.’”219  Respect for school authorities had been the cornerstone of the 
Court’s initial stance upholding the mandatory pledge.220   The Barnette ma-
jority proceeded to ignore the state’s asserted interests in “increasing [stu-
dents’] knowledge of . . . the government” and applied its harshest scrutiny 
to the pledge.221  This is a far cry from deferential jurisprudence. 
The Court has likewise withheld deference from other state compulsory 
efforts where even the risk of misattribution was present.  As discussed supra, 
the Court refused to defer to New Hampshire’s interest in categorizing motor 
vehicles in Wooley222 and Massachusetts’s interest in preventing discrimina-
tion in Hurley.223  In neither case were the plaintiffs personally required to 
mouth objectionable ideological messages.  However, because the state 
forced these plaintiffs to associate “intimately”224 with personally objection-
able ideas, endorsement could easily be attributed to them.225  By applying 
strict scrutiny in both cases, the Court signaled that freedom of the mind is 
one liberty too precious to expose to minimal judicial review. 
Withholding deference from such curricular decisions would be con-
sistent with the courts’ current refusal to show any special respect, in the re-
lated Establishment Clause context, for curricular decisions that compel stu-
dents to participate in religious activities.  For example, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a public school curricular exercise that forced students to recite a 
 
 219 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. 
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 597–98 (1943)). 
 220 See Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 598 (stating that “[t]he wisdom of training children in patriotic impulses by 
those compulsions which necessarily pervade so much of the educational process is not for our 
independent judgment. . . . [T]he courtroom is not the arena for debating issues of educational 
policy.”). 
 221 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 626 n.1. 
 222 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977).  
 223 Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 578–79 (1995). 
 224 Id. at 576 (explaining that a speaker who has an intimate connection with a particular view or 
communication loses the autonomy of his speech if he is forced to express ideas relating to that view 
which are contrary to his own). 
 225 Id. at 575 (“GLIB’s participation would likely be perceived as having resulted from the Council’s 
customary determination about a unit admitted to the parade, that its message was worthy of 
presentation and quite possibly of support as well.”); Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 (“New Hampshire’s 
statute in effect requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the 
State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty, as Maynard already has.  As a condition to driving 
an automobile—a virtual necessity for most Americans—the Maynards must display ‘Live Free or 
Die’ to hundreds of people each day. . . . The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to 
hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire 
commands, an idea they find morally objectionable.”). 
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school-prescribed prayer226 as well as one that required Bible reading and 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer.227  In neither case did the Court give any 
weight to the schools’ asserted pedagogical justifications,228 and in the latter 
case, the majority specified that it was explicitly reversing the prior “govern-
ing principle of nearly complete deference to administrative discretion.”229  
Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit refused to grant 
federal educators any deference when it voided mandatory chapel attend-
ance at three of the nation’s preeminent military academies.230  This is par-
ticularly significant given that the federal government is often granted defer-
ence over matters pertinent to military training.231  The coerced prayers and 
forced participation in religious activities in these cases are directly analogous 
to the mandatory pledge in Barnette.232  In each case, however, while these 
exercises were part of the curriculum, none of the respective courts subjected 
them to deferential review or even mentioned the need to defer to educators. 
 
 226 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962) (holding that “New York’s program of daily classroom 
invocation of God’s blessings” constituted “a practice wholly inconsistent with the Establishment 
Clause”). 
 227 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (explaining that the Bible read-
ing and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer was “prescribed as part of the curricular activities of stu-
dents” and holding that such “exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause”). 
 228 See id. at 223–24 (ignoring the state’s contention that the prayers were justified by secular purposes, 
including the “promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, 
the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature”); see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 425 
(ignoring the Board of Regents of New York’s attempt to justify the prayer as a shared part of the 
community’s “spiritual heritage”). 
 229 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 275. 
 230 See Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (holding unconstitutional mandatory 
chapel attendance at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, the United States Naval 
Academy at Annapolis, Maryland, and the United States Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, 
Colorado).  In reversing the district court, the court of appeals noted that the district court’s grant 
of deference “to the unique role of the military” was inappropriate.  Id. at 293.  
 231 See id. at 294–95 (“Personal freedoms of conduct and appearance have been accommodated to the 
military’s perceived need to establish procedures best suited to regulate its day-to-day operations, 
duty assignments and call-up orders; to determine a reservist’s discharge of his duties; to regulate 
physical appearance; and to ascertain ‘the essential characteristics of fitness for duty.’  This defer-
ence to military decisionmaking has been justified by the military’s role, its mandate to prepare for 
the waging of war, and the necessity of this mandate for our national security.  However, deference 
has inherent limitations which have also been fully recognized in judicial decision. . . .  Individual 
freedom may not be sacrificed to military interests to the point that constitutional rights are abol-
ished.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 232 In Anderson, the court flatly rejected the government’s attempt to distinguish “compelling attendance 
at church and compelling worship or belief.” Id. at 291.   
Neither appellees, nor the dissenting opinion infra, reveal how a government could possi-
bly compel individual worship or belief other than by compelling certain overt actions—
for example, profession of belief in God; recitation of prayers; or mere presence during 
Bible readings.  Attendance during chapel services is indistinguishable from these other 
overt actions, the compulsion of which has been declared unconstitutional in Torcaso v. 
Watkins, School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, and Engel v. Vitale. 
  Id. 
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Therefore, the appeal to university deference, like the related appeals for 
lower scrutiny, is simply not persuasive when public educators compel affir-
mation of ideas either actually or apparently. 
V.  THE PROPOSAL IN PRACTICE 
This Article proposes a sound and comprehensive method for addressing 
compelled curricular speech claims in the public university setting.  Contrary 
to the standards proposed by some commentators and the three appellate 
courts that have addressed the issue, this Article maintains that courts should 
apply a nuanced standard that affords universities much less deference when 
they compel student speech.  Accordingly, a court hearing a student’s claim 
that her public university employed its curriculum to force her to speak 
against her will should utilize the framework explained in Part II. 
This framework is obviously far less deferential to university officials than 
the blanket Hazelwood standard applied by the Axson-Flynn and Ward courts.  
Yet this model is justified because it more fully respects the constitutional 
rights of the student and more carefully delineates the limits on state power 
over the mind.  Its true impact can be seen when it is applied to the hypo-
thetical students Abigail and Lauren introduced at the beginning of the Ar-
ticle, and to the plaintiffs in Axson-Flynn and Ward.   
A.  Abigail and Lauren 
Over her objections, Abigail’s college has required her to sign its “State-
ment of Diversity and Social Justice” as a condition of receiving her teaching 
degree.  The college is clearly using its curriculum to force her to endorse 
certain ideas she opposes.  Moreover, this statement and its tenets are pa-
tently ideological in nature, as reasonable minds would likely disagree on 
what constitutes “diversity” and “social justice.”  If Abigail challenged this 
requirement in court, she would likely prevail under the model proposed in 
this Article.  By forcing Abigail to demonstrate her “respect” for diversity and 
her “commitment” to social justice, as understood by college officials, the 
college has transgressed the threshold inquiry by purposefully compelling her 
to affirm an ideology—the approach explicitly condemned by Barnette.  This 
is the quintessential example of a government-imposed orthodoxy that no 
government officials—including educators—are permitted to enforce under 
the First Amendment.   
In contrast, Lauren’s professor of political advocacy would likely survive 
the first step of the proposed framework, even though he has compelled her 
to support legislation that she personally opposes.  He could convincingly 
argue that he has required his students to petition the state legislature not to 
force them to affirm any ideas about guns, but rather to provide them with 
132 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 20:1 
real-life experience in grassroots political advocacy.  While his purpose may 
be legitimate, the assignment should still trigger strict scrutiny under the se-
cond step of the proposed model because it has the effect of communicating 
her support for HB 1122 to others.  Any legislator receiving Lauren’s letter 
would reasonably perceive that she endorses the bill, because the letter bears 
her name and is thus intimately associated with her.  Lauren’s university can-
not defend on the grounds that she does not actually endorse the viewpoint 
in the letter.  Wooley and Hurley presumptively condemn the letter-writing 
activity because it forces Lauren to serve as a “courier for [the State’s] mes-
sage.”233  Indeed, this can easily occur anytime assignments require students 
to communicate to third parties unaffiliated with the school, such as in a 
clinic or internship.  Lauren’s professor might try to justify the intrusion, but 
this would be a tall order.  If EMU’s interests in teaching professional ethical 
codes and avoiding loss of accreditation were insufficiently weighty in Ward, 
it is difficult to imagine what interest Lauren’s university could offer to satisfy 
this step.234  Even if the professor could conceivably produce a compelling 
interest, the assignment would still fail because accommodating Lauren’s ob-
jections by permitting her not to send the letter to the legislature would surely 
be a less restrictive means of achieving the professor’s goals. 
Therefore, under the first two steps of the proposed framework, it is 
highly unlikely that either curricular mandate would survive judicial review.  
In fact, a federal court applying this analysis would likely grant summary 
judgment in favor of Abigail and Lauren, respectively. 
B.  Ward and Axson-Flynn 
While the facts in the Ward case are more complex, EMU’s expulsion of 
Julea Ward would also likely fail the second step.  EMU expelled Ward for 
refusing to voice the university’s preferred message on sexual ethics to a third 
party in the school’s counseling clinic.  Sexual ethics and other values-based 
matters are clearly ideological, and as the Sixth Circuit noted, they have gen-
erated significant debate even within the mental health profession itself.235  
Furthermore, any person receiving counsel on sexual issues from Ward at 
EMU (i.e., counseling in line with EMU’s imposed values) would reasonably 
conclude that Ward supports the guidance she is providing—first, because of 
the fact that Ward herself is speaking (and absent confounding circumstances, 
 
 233 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (finding that the state interest in disseminating a 
particular ideology “cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right[s]”). 
 234 See Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 740 (6th Cir. 2012) (confirming that the state interests articulated 
by EMU could not satisfy strict scrutiny).  
 235 See id. at 735–36 (noting disagreement among various counseling professionals on the permissibility 
of referrals when the counselor disagrees with the values of the client, specifically those related to 
sexual orientation).   
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people usually assume that others believe what they verbalize), and second, 
because of the unique standards of speech in a counseling environment (coun-
selors are bound by ethical codes to avoid causing harm and to always pro-
mote the good of the client).236  Any client can thus rationally presume that 
the speaking professional endorses her own counsel, at least to the extent that 
it is beneficial and not harmful.  Because Ward’s client would likely perceive 
that Ward was personally endorsing the position on sexual ethics that she pro-
vided (the one forced on her by EMU), the university infringed upon her free-
dom of mind.  Consequently, the judges should have applied strict scrutiny to 
the expulsion decision and ruled in Ward’s favor, given that the university 
effectively conceded its interests were not compelling.237  Thus, the university 
would not have even reached Step 4 in the proposed analysis. 
Unlike the examples above, Christina Axson-Flynn’s compelled speech 
claim would have satisfied the first two inquiries of the proposed framework.  
University of Utah officials could pass the threshold inquiry on the grounds 
that they did not assign the offensive script for the purpose of forcing her to 
endorse any ideas contained in it.  The Tenth Circuit found no evidence to 
the contrary.  The script requirement would also survive the effect step, be-
cause no one would reasonably assume Axson-Flynn’s affirmation of the ideas 
in the script for the simple reason that she was acting.238  The very nature of 
acting inherently dilutes the association between the speaker and the views 
expressed by his or her character; consequently, there was no reasonable risk 
that others might presume that Axson-Flynn endorsed the objectionable lines.  
Thus, there was no need to apply strict scrutiny under the second step. 
The Court appropriately considered whether the script requirement 
jeopardized other constitutional rights, and concluded that Axson-Flynn had 
raised a colorable free-exercise claim that entitled her to a jury trial.239  The 
proper scrutiny then depended upon the nature of the script requirement.  
 
 236 See, e.g., CODE OF ETHICS, at 3 (AM. COUNSELING ASS’N 2014) (stating that among “[t]he funda-
mental principles of professional ethical behavior are . . . nonmaleficence, or avoiding actions that 
cause harm [and] beneficence, or working for the good of the individual and society by promoting 
mental health and well-being . . . .”).  
 237 See Ward, 667 F.3d at 740 (stating that “[t]he university does not argue that its actions can withstand 
strict scrutiny, and we agree.  Whatever interest the university served by expelling Ward, it falls 
short of compelling”). 
 238 Of course, even in the acting context, a university’s acting curriculum has constitutional limits.  For 
example, a school could not require an objecting student to disrobe as part of her performance as 
this mandate would likely infringe upon the student’s right to privacy.  This is one more example 
that shows the importance of Step 3 in the proposed analysis. 
 239 See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1293–94 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding that the factfinder 
needed to resolve the issue of whether or not the law requiring Axson-Flynn “to say words whose 
utterance would violate her religious beliefs” was neutral, which would elicit a rational basis review, 
or pretextual, which would require strict scrutiny). 
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The Free Exercise Clause would permit rational-basis review if the script ob-
ligation was “neutral and generally applicable”—but the clause would im-
pose strict scrutiny if the school permitted “individualized exemptions.”240  
This is yet another example of the importance of Step 3 in protecting the 
rights of dissenting university students. 
Only after considering these inquiries, however, should the Tenth Circuit 
have proceeded to the fourth and final step in the proposed analysis.  And 
even then, the court should have applied a more potent version of Hazelwood 
scrutiny that accounted for the nature of the university and the adult students 
that study there.  These analytical errors aside, the court properly concluded 
that Axson-Flynn was entitled to a trial because there was sufficient evidence 
for a jury to conclude that the script mandate was motivated by religious 
animus.241  The outcome of the script requirement would then have been 
resolved at trial.  If the jury trusted Axson-Flynn, the curtain would close, so 
to speak, but if the jury believed the university, the show would go on. 
Applying the proposed framework to the foregoing hypotheticals and 
cases reveals that the real potency of the proposed model exists in the first 
two steps.  Indeed, Lauren and Abigail would likely have lost if their respec-
tive universities had needed only to produce any “legitimate pedagogical” 
interest.  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit probably would have granted summary 
judgment to the plaintiff in Ward given the university’s concession that it 
could not survive strict scrutiny.  Even if there were genuine factual issues to 
be resolved by a jury, the proposed model would have drastically improved 
Ward’s chances of prevailing at trial by raising the university’s burden signif-
icantly.  Finally, the proposed model would have had little effect, if any, upon 
the appellate decision or any subsequent trial in Axson-Flynn, given the unique 
nature of the University of Utah’s curricular speech assignment.  However, 
what cannot be gainsaid is the effect this framework would have on the liti-
gation expectations of both students and universities by effectively reversing 
the presumption of deference (i.e., away from the university).  Adoption of 
this framework would produce a seismic shift in expectations, with the result 
that public universities would have to tread more carefully when they require 
 
 240 See id. at 1294–95; 1297–98 (discussing the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the plaintiff’s 
claim under the free exercise of religion clause, and finding that a rule that is discriminatorily mo-
tivated is not a rule of general applicability; that even if the rule is one of general applicability, it 
may still require strict scrutiny if it falls under one of two exceptions: a hybrid rights exception, for 
which a plaintiff must demonstrate a “fair probability or a likelihood” of success on an accompa-
nying constitutional claim, and an individualized-exemption exception, for which a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that she is forced to choose between “following the precepts of her religion” and com-
plying with a legal requirement).  
 241 See id. at 1293 (concluding that “[v]iewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Axson-
Flynn, . . . there [was] a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendants’ justification for 
the script adherence requirement was truly pedagogical or whether it was a pretext for religious 
discrimination.  Therefore, summary judgment was improper.”). 
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students to advocate for potentially offensive ideological positions.  And if 
colleges were to tread on such shaky constitutional soil, they could anticipate 
more settlements, summary judgments, and jury verdicts . . . in favor of the 
objecting students. 
CONCLUSION 
When a public university uses its curriculum to force a student to affirm 
an ideology that the student finds personally offensive, that assignment must 
be subject to the strictest judicial scrutiny.  The Supreme Court directly af-
firmed this position in Barnette and expanded the doctrine in Wooley to include 
even apparent affirmations of belief.  The Court has further confirmed this 
high standard in other cases—cases in which a citizen forced to profess a belief 
claimed violations of the Free Exercise Clause, the Establishment Clause, and 
the freedom of association.  Moreover, the foundational principles supporting 
the First Amendment yield a similar conclusion: the opinions of men are pre-
sumed to lie beyond the state’s power to control. 
Even when a public university does not purposefully employ its curricu-
lum to coerce students, it may still trigger heightened constitutional review.  
Forced disclosures of fact or opinion can easily tread upon, among other 
rights, the rights of association, privacy, due process, and religious freedom.  
Historically, official mandates that activate one of these freedoms have faced 
close judicial scrutiny. 
A few courts, namely the Sixth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, appear to 
have reversed this presumption in favor of a more lenient standard that 
overtly defers to the curricular decisions of public educators.  However, the 
justifications for more deferential standards are simply unpersuasive.  Stu-
dents who choose to attend state universities do not waive their rights under 
the compelled speech doctrine any more than they waive other First Amend-
ment freedoms.  In addition, a blanket application of Hazelwood to compelled 
curricular speech claims ignores the fundamental differences between com-
pelled speech and compelled silence.  Such overbroad use of this test also 
overlooks the fundamental differences in the constitutional protection af-
forded to minors in grade schools and adults in universities.  Likewise, those 
who prophesy that demanding scrutiny will doom public education fail to 
understand the distinction between permissible comprehension and uncon-
stitutional affirmation.  Finally, any presumption that judges are incompetent 
to review academic decisions simply does not apply when state educators 
compel affirmation of belief. 
Overall, these objections fail because they miss the larger picture.  While 
a state university provides an education, it is ultimately an arm of the gov-
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ernment, and the Constitution imposes fundamental limitations on that en-
tity’s power.242  When the state tries to compel citizens to adopt its views as 
orthodox, it “invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which . . . [is] re-
serve[d] from all official control.”243  This is true whether the government 
official is a prince, a president, or a professor.  We recognize this principle 
when officials violate the rights of those driving in cars and marching in pa-
rades.  It is time to recognize anew that this principle also covers those study-
ing in the college classroom.  The one fixed star in our constitutional constel-
lation demands no less. 
 
 
 242 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 424 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The public schools are 
invaluable and beneficent institutions, but they are, after all, organs of the State.  When public 
school authorities regulate student speech, they act as agents of the State . . . .”).  
 243 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (finding that the State requirement 
of a “flag salute and pledge” violated the First Amendment). 
